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ABSTRACT:   The mother lode of criminal law 
scholarship is a unitary theory of excuses, that is, a 
normative account as to why a person who engages in 
conduct that a criminal statute prohibits ought 
nevertheless not be blamed for it.  After defining 
Aexcuse@ against commentators who argue that it 
cannot be coherently defined, and after criticizing  
competing theories of excuse, I argue that the feature 
that renders persons normatively blameless -- and, 
typically, legally blameless, too -- for engaging in 
conduct that a criminal statute prohibits is the 
possession of a certain attitude with which he engages 
in it.   A person is normatively blameless if, despite 
engaging in conduct that a statute prohibits, he was 
motivated by proper respect for interests that the 
statute seeks to protect.  
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AN ATTITUDINAL THEORY OF EXCUSE 
The mother lode of criminal responsibility  scholarship is a 
unitary theory of criminal excuses, that is, a persuasive normative 
account of why the criminal law adjudges actors to be blameless 
despite their having committed criminal wrongs.1
The law=s other criminal defenses do not readily lend 
themselves to unitary normative accounts or, if they do, rest on 
normative accounts that are self-evident.  Consider what Paul 
Robinson aptly calls Anon-exculpatory@ defenses,2 that is, defenses like 
double jeopardy and diplomatic immunity that bar actors from being 
tried for  reasons that are independent of whether or not they engaged 
in the blameworthy conduct with which they are charged.  Individual 
non-exculpatory  defenses such as double jeopardy may be difficult to 
explicate, but double jeopardy and diplomatic immunity share 
nothing normative in common, except that, like all non-exculpatory 
defenses, they bar actors from being tried and convicted.  Consider, 
too, a defendant who denies that he committed the actus reus of a 
charged offense or who claims that, if he committed it, he did so 
because it was the lesser of two evils and, hence, justified.  Unlike 
 
1 See Michael Moore, Choice, Character, and Excuse, in PLACING BLAME 548 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, ____)(A[Excuses are the royal road to theories 
of responsibility generally@).  For others who have proposed theories of excuse, 
see Richard Brandt, A Motivational Theory of Excuses, in J. PENNOCK AND J. 
CHAPMAN, EDS., NOMOS: CRIMINAL JUSTICE 165 (New York: New York 
University, 1985); Michael Corrado, Notes on the Structure of a Theory of Excuses, 
82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 465 (1991); Joshua Dressler, UNDERSTANDING 
CRIMINAL LAW ' 17.03 (3d ed., New York: Lexis Publishing, 2001); Claire 
Finkelstein, Excuses and Dispositions in Criminal Law, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. R. 317 
(2002); George Fletcher, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 798-817 (Boston:  Little, 
Brown, 1978); John Gardner, The Gist of Excuses, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. R. 575 
(1998); H.L.A. Hart, Legal Responsibility and Excuses, in PUNISHMENT AND 
RESPONSIBILITY 28 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968); Sanford Kadish, Excusing 
Crime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 257 (1987); Paul Robinson, Excuses, in STRUCTURE 
AND FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW 81-94 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997); Robert Sullivan, Making Excuses, in A. Simester & A. Smith, eds., Harm 
and Culpability ____ (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1996); George Vuoso, 
Background, Responsibility, and Excuse, 96 YALE L.J. 1661 (1987); Glanville 
Williams, The Theory of Excuses, 1982 CRIM. L. REV. 732. 
2 See Paul Robinson, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW 71-77. 
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non-exculpatory defenses, these are Aexculpatory defenses@ because 
they deny that the defendant engaged in conduct that was 
blameworthy. Nevertheless, actus reus defenses rest on unitary norms 
that are transparent -- namely, that all things considered, the 
defendant did  nothing that the applicable criminal law regards as an 
undesirable or regrettable thing for an actor to do under the 
circumstances. 
Like the aforementioned defenses of actus reus and 
justification, excuses are also exculpatory defenses; for they, too, deny 
that those who invoke them engaged in conduct that is blameworthy. 
 Yet unlike defenses of lack of actus reus and  justification, excuses 
obtain even when a defendant has done something that society 
regards as undesirable or regrettable under the circumstances.  
Indeed, defendants may engage in the most heinous conduct and 
nevertheless possess excuses.  Recall John W. Hinckley.  Hinckley 
loaded his .22 caliber pistol with so-called ADevastator@ bullets which 
explode on contact and shot at President Ronald Reagan six times, 
grievously wounding Reagan and two of his security personnel and 
inflicting permanent brain damage on White House Press Secretary, 
James Brady.3 The federal statutes that make it a crime to assassinate 
the President are designed to prevent precisely such conduct, and the 
heinousness of what Hinckley undertook would have justified the 
Secret Service in killing him to prevent it.  Nevertheless, Hinckley 
possessed a defense of insanity that excused him from being 
condemned and punished for the heinous thing he did. 
Insanity is one of several  excuses that criminal codes typically 
provide, including (but not limited to) involuntariness, immaturity, 
involuntary intoxication, and mistakes of fact and law.  The question 
for criminal law scholars is whether these excuses are predicated on a 
unitary normative  principle and, if so, what the principle is.  The 
question is important because if such a  principle exists and can be 
identified, it can serve as a normative guide to jurisdictions in 
deciding how broadly or narrowly to enact and construe excuses in 
areas in which their existence or scope is contested.  The  question is 
 
3 See generally Lincoln Caplan, The Insanity Defense and the Trial of John W. 
Hinckley (New York: Dell, 1987). 
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also fundamental because to understand  when some actors ought to 
be excused is, ultimately, to understand when other actors are 
blameworthy. 
Now some commentators deny the possibility of a theory of 
excuses as such because they deny any distinction between excuses 
and justifications.4 Other commentators believe that theories of 
criminal excuse are ultimately derivative of theories of punishment 
itself,5 leaving the former just as normatively contestable as the latter. 
 Still others claim to have identified a workable theory of excuses, e.g., 
that actors are excused for engaging in regrettable conduct when they 
have no Achoice@ or Acontrol@ to act otherwise than they do.6
I believe these views are mistaken.  The difference between 
justification and excuse, properly understood, is as basic and simple as 
the difference between, AI did nothing wrong,@ and AEven if I did, it 
was not my fault.@ Theories of excuse do not presuppose theories of 
punishment,  provided that it is agreed that the state ought not  to 
declare things to be true that it knows to be false.  Existing theories of 
excuse are not able to account for what  they include as Aexcuses,@
and they are not able to distinguish what they exclude as non-
excuses. 
Part I defines Aexcuse,@ and it does so by distinguishing it from 
Ajustification@ and defenses of actus reus. Part II responds to 
commentators  who deny that excuse is a moral category that can be 
meaningfully distinguished from justification.  Part III addresses 
several contending definitions and normative accounts of Aexcuse.@
Part IV  advances a normative account of excuses based upon the 
normative predicates of speech-acts of reproach. To reproach a person 
for conduct is to express the belief that he acted with a reprehensible 
attitude toward the legitimate interests of himself or others.  Just as a 
state ought not to reproach persons for acts that they do not commit, 
a state ought not to reproach persons for acts that do not manifest 
reprehensible attitudes toward themselves or others. 
 
4 See notes ____, infra. 
5 See Brandt, A Motivational Theory of Excuses, pp. 169-71; Corrado, Notes on 
the Structure of a Theory of Excuses, pp. 470-71. 
6 See notes _____, infra. 
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I.  A DEFINITION OF AEXCUSE@
All theories of excuse are normative accounts regarding when 
actors ought to be excused for engaging in prohibited conduct, and, as 
such, they presuppose a definition of that for which they claim to  
account -- namely, Aexcuses.@ Suppose, for example, that two 
commentators each set out to rationalize excuses, one of whom 
understands  excuses to encompass non-exculpatory defenses like 
double jeopardy, and the other of whom does not.  These respective 
commentators produce different theories of excuse because they begin 
from different starting points as to what counts as an Aexcuse.@ To 
assess the normative significance of their respective theories, one must 
assess their classifications of defenses, including their definitions of 
Aexcuse.@ I shall argue that excuses are best understood in 
relationship to two other exculpatory defenses, namely, lack of actus 
reus and justification.  
There is extensive literature on distinctions between excuse 
and justification, some of it quite critical of the distinction.  It is a 
mistake, however, to begin an exposition of excuse by juxtaposing it  
to justification because justification is itself a contested category.  
Instead, therefore, we shall start with a category of exculpatory 
defenses that is easily understood and non-controversial, i.e., the 
claim by a defendant that he did not commit the actus reus of the 
charged offense.  With the latter defense thus firmly in mind, I will 
argue that Ajustification,@ as I define it, is a set of exculpatory defenses 
that derive from the same principle as that which underlies the actus 
reus defense but that come into play only where actus reus defenses are 
unavailing -- namely, where the commission of the actus reus of an 
offense is regarded in law as no greater a legal evil than the alternative 
evil an actor would have to choose under the dilemmatic 
circumstances in which he finds himself.  I will conclude by arguing 
that Aexcuses@ are nothing but the residual set of exculpatory defenses 
to wrongdoing that exist in law over and above defenses of actus reus 
and justification are fully accounted for.  
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Before proceeding, however, I should clarify what I mean by 
criminal Adefenses.@ I use Adefense@ broadly to refer to all claims to 
the effect that, given such evidence as is otherwise admissible and  
given such burdens of proof as otherwise apply, the state may not 
lawfully try and/or convict a defendant of an offense at issue. 
Accordingly, I do not use Adefense@ to refer to exclusionary rules 
regarding the admissibility of real or testimonial evidence; nor do I use 
Adefense@ to refer solely to claims upon which the defense has  
burdens of proof; nor do I use it to refer to claims that come into play 
after the elements of an offense have been established.  I will speak of 
Adefenses@ of lack of actus reus and lack of mens rea and Adefenses@ of 
justification, even though the prosecution invariably has burdens of 
persuasion with respect to the former and the defense often has 
burdens of persuasion with respect to the latter. 
 
A.  The Defense of Lack of Actus Reus 
Every criminal statute contains  both an actus reus and, unless 
it is a strict liability statute, mens rea as well.  The Aactus reus@ of an 
offense is conduct that the statute prohibits, regardless of mental 
states with which the conduct may otherwise be done.  AConduct,@
whether in the form of an action or omission,7 is any harm or risk for 
which an actor is a but/for cause, or any undertaking that goes beyond 
Amere thoughts@ by which a person actualizes his purposes in the 
world.  Typically, the conduct constituting the actus reus is prohibited 
because it represents a harm or risk that the state seeks to prevent.  
Consider a murder statute that makes it a crime if a person 
Aunlawfully and with malice aforethought causes the death of another 
human being@8 (while using the term Aunlawfu[l]@ to refer to killings 
that are unjustified  evils under the circumstances).  Obviously, a 
 
7 An Aaction@ is the conduct of producing a certain regrettable  state of affairs 
by altering such events as would otherwise occur, e.g., a motorist=s causing a 
pedestrian=s death  by hitting the pedestrian in a crosswalk.  An Aomission@ is the 
conduct of producing a certain regrettable state of affairs by refraining from 
arresting such events as occur, e.g., a passing motorist=s causing a mortally-
wounded pedestrian=s death by refraining from calling an ambulance. 
8 See, e.g., 21 Oklahoma Statutes ' 701.7 (2003). 
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person is guilty under the statute only if he does all of what the 
statute specifies as a condition of liability, including acting with the 
mens rea of Amalice aforethought.@ However, the actus reus of the 
offense consists of only  a portion of what the statute specifies as 
conditions of liability.  The actus reus of murder consists of conduct 
that the state regards as regrettable even if it is inflicted by  actors 
without malice aforethought or without any guilty mind for that 
matter -- namely, the conduct of Aunlawfully . . . caus[ing] the death 
of another human being.@
The conduct that murder statutes prohibit is regrettable 
because it is a material harm.  Indeed, the material harm upon which 
murder statutes are predicated, i.e., unlawful homicide, is regarded in 
law as so fearsome that murder is the only offense for which the U.S. 
Supreme Court has allowed the death penalty.9 Not all criminal 
offenses, however, are predicated on material harm.  Many offenses 
are predicated on conduct that the state regards as regrettable 
because of the risks of material harm it presents.  Consider the 
unlawful possession or sale of drugs.  In themselves, acts of unlawfully 
possessing or selling drugs inflict no harm that the state wishes to 
prevent, provided the acts do not lead to the unlawful ingestion of 
drugs.  Nevertheless, the state regards the unlawful possession and 
sale of drugs as regrettable because of the risks of harm they involve, 
i.e., that they will result in harm of the unlawful ingestion of drugs.  
The same is true of offenses like Areckless endangerment@10 that are 
explicitly defined in terms of risk of harm. 
The offenses we have thus far considered all involve 
prohibited conduct that is Aobjective@ in the sense that it is conduct 
that the state regrets and can identify without making any reference 
to an actor=s state of mind.  To be sure, a defendant will not be guilty 
of an offense requiring mens rea unless in addition to performing the 
actus reus, he also does so with the guilty mind required.  But with 
respect to the aforementioned offenses, the state can determine  
whether an actor engages  in conduct that the state regards as 
regrettable without inquiring into what he was thinking.  That is not 
 
9 Cf. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
10 Model Penal Code ' 211.2. 
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true of all criminal offenses, however.  Some criminal offenses involve 
an actus reus that is itself partly constituted by an actor=s state of 
mind.  The Model Penal Code offense of attempt is a good example.  
As with most offenses, an actor is not guilty of attempt unless he 
commits the actus reus of attempt and does so with mens rea. The 
mens rea of attempt under the MPC is purpose: an actor is guilty of 
attempt to commit crime X under the MPC  if, in addition to 
performing the actus reus of attempt, he does so with the purpose or 
belief that he is committing crime X.11 What is distinctive about 
attempt under the MPC, however, is its actus reus because in contrast 
to the offenses we have thus far discussed, the actus reus of attempt 
under the MPC is itself defined by reference to the mens rea of 
attempt.  A person performs the actus reus of attempt to commit crime 
X under the MPC if he engages in conduct that constitutes a 
Asubstantial step@ toward committing crime X; and conduct 
constitutes a substantial step toward committing crime X if, and only 
if, it is conduct that is Astrongly corroborative of the actor=s criminal 
purpose.@12
This is not to say that attempt under the MPC involves no 
actus reus. As with all offenses, an actor is guilty of attempt only if he 
actualizes his purposes in the world by doing more than possessing 
mere thoughts, whether he does so by means of an  action or an 
omission.13 However, because the actus reus of attempt is defined by 
reference to an actor=s mental state, it is not  predicated on the 
occurrence of regrettable harms or risks in the way that other offenses 
are.  To be sure, some criminal attempts, like Hinckley=s attempted 
assassination of Ronald Reagan, present the most frightful risks.  But 
other criminal attempts,  such as sting operations, do not.  The actus 
reus of attempt is conduct the state prohibits not because it consists of 
 
11 See Model Penal Code ' 5.01(1). 
12 Model Penal Code ' 5.01(2). 
13 For discussion of the moral and legal prohibition punishing a person for 
mere thoughts, see Meir Dan-Cohen, Harmful Thoughts, 18 LAW AND 
PHILOSOPHY 379-405 (1999). 
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regrettable harms or risks but because it manifests an undesirable 
readiness on an actor=s part to bring such harms or risks about.14
Nevertheless, regardless of the form the actus reus of an offense 
takes, an actor is not guilty of the offense unless he engages in it.  
Thus, an actor is not guilty of homicide unless he unlawfully causes 
the death of another human being;  he is not guilty of drug possession 
or sale unless he unlawfully possesses or sells drugs; and he is not 
guilty of attempting crime X unless he takes a substantial step toward 
it that strongly corroborates his purpose to commit crime X. In each 
case, in measuring his conduct by what the statute declares to be a 
regrettable harm or risk or otherwise undesirable conduct, a person 
who does not commit the actus reus of a charged offense can rightly 
say, AI did nothing wrong.@
B.  The Defense of Justification 
Commentators differ sharply over the nature of justification 
and its relationship to excuse.  Some argue that there is no moral  
distinction between justification and excuse.15 Others argue that 
there is a significant distinction, while disagreeing among themselves 
about the very nature of the distinction -- some arguing that 
justification is a state of mind,16 others arguing that it is a state of 
affairs,17 and still others arguing that it is both.18 Despite their 
 
14 This is why there is no such thing as a Ajustified@ attempt.  As we shall see, 
justification comes into play only after an actor has produced a harm or risk that 
the criminal law otherwise regards as regrettable, something that an actor does 
not necessarily do in committing an inchoate offense.  See Peter Westen and 
James Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress:  A Justification, Not an Excuse 
B And Why It Matters, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 878-79 (2003)(hereinafter 
AThe Criminal Defense of Duress@). 
15 See, e.g., Mitchell  Berman, Justification and Excuse, Law and Morality, 53 
DUKE L.J.  1  (2003). 
16 See, e.g., Berman, Justification and Excuse, p. 47; Kent Greenawalt, The 
Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1847, 1903-11 
(1984). 
17 See, e.g., Paul Robinson,  STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW 
95-124. 
18 See, e.g., John Gardner, Justifications and Reasons, in HARM AND 
CULPABILITY 103, 105 (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1996). 
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differences, however, commentators agree that justification (or 
justification and excuse, for those who doubt the distinction) is a 
defense that comes into play once the actus reus of an offense is 
complete.  Justification is the claim by an actor that in so far as he 
committed the actus reus of an offense, he is not blameworthy because 
he committed it in the context of a choice of evils that justified his 
committing it.19
I shall be arguing that there is  a significant normative 
distinction  between Ajustification@ and Aexcuse,@ properly understood. 
 To illuminate the distinction I have in mind, however, it is important 
to demystify a distinction that is not normatively significant but 
merely formal -- namely, the distinction between the actus reus 
defenses previously discussed and choice-of-evils defenses to an actus 
reus. Choice-of-evils defenses to an actus reus arise with respect to 
offenses like murder and drug sales that are predicated on material 
harms or risks a state has a prima facie interest in preventing.20 As 
such, choice-of-evils defenses can be framed in one or the other of 
two ways without altering their normative effect: they can be 
explicitly framed as defenses of Ajustification@ that come into play 
once the actus reus is complete; or, alternatively, the negation of such 
choices of evils can be included as a portion of the actus reus. 
Whichever form they take, an actor who possesses such a defense can 
rightly say the same thing of himself as an actor who fails to commit 
the actus reus of an offense, namely, AI did nothing wrong.@
To illustrate, consider a paradigmatic choice of evils.  Suppose 
that a policeman in North Dakota, cooly and deliberately shoots and 
kills an armed assailant whom he has warned to drop his gun but who 
endangers the lives of the policeman and others by continuing to fire 
at them.  Suppose, too, that the policeman is charged with murder 
under a North Dakota statute that makes it an offense to 
Aintentionally or knowingly caus[e] the death of another human 
being.@21 The policeman can hardly deny that he committed the actus 
reus of Acausing the death of another human being.@ Nor can the 
 
19 Cf. Model Penal Code '' 3.01, 3.02. 
20 See John Gardner, Justifications and Reasons, p. 107. 
21 North Dakota Century Code ' 12.1-16-01(1)(a) (2004). 
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policeman deny that he killed Aintentionally.@ The policeman 
nevertheless has a defense to murder under North Dakota law 
because, having declared it to be prima  facie undesirable to Acause 
the death of another human being,@ North Dakota goes on to specify 
situations in which killings are not regrettable, all things considered  B
namely, when they are necessary to protect oneself or others from 
being unlawfully killed or seriously wounded.22 North Dakota thus 
proceeds in two steps.  First, it defines the actus reus of murder broadly 
to consist of the harm of  Acaus[ing] the death of another human 
being,@ despite the fact that the broad definition includes killings that 
North Dakota does not regard as regrettable.  Then, having defined 
the actus reus of murder overbroadly as something that is only prima 
facie prohibited, North Dakota specifies subsets of those homicides 
that it declares to be Ajustified@ (including the circumstances under 
which the policeman acted) B thereby implicitly specifying a residual 
subset that it regards as not justified.  Needless to say, North Dakota 
could have achieved the same substantive results in a single step by 
combining the actus reus of Acausing the death of another human 
being@ with the residual set of homicides that its  justification 
provisions now implicitly specify to be not justified.  Thus, North 
Dakota could have said that an actor is guilty of murder if, while 
acting intentionally or with knowledge, he Aunjustifiably causes the 
death of another human being@ -- or, more explicitly, Acauses the 
death of a human being without its being necessary to protect himself 
or others from being unlawfully killed or seriously wounded.@ Indeed, 
that is precisely what the statute with which I began the last section 
does, i.e., the statute that makes it an offense to Aunlawfully and with 
malice aforethought cause the death of another human being.@ The 
term Aunlawful@ in the statute is a catch-all within the actus reus of 
murder that incorporates by reference all the circumstances in which 
actors are not confronted with choices of evils that negate the harm 
of killing a human being.23
22 See North Dakota Century Code ' 12.1-16-01(2)(b) (2004). 
23 This is not to say that the term Aunlawful@ always refers to absence of 
justification in criminal statute.  It can be used as mere surplusage.  See, e.g., the 
English statute in R v. R, [1992] 1 AC 599, [1991] 4 All ER 481, and the Ohio 
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The difference, then, between a statute like North Dakota=s, 
which proceeds in two steps, and a statute that proceeds in one step is 
entirely formal.  Every choice of evil that is stated as a Ajustification@
within a two-step statute that possesses an overly broad actus reus 
could be stated instead in negative form within a one-step statute 
consisting of an actus reus alone.24 Indeed, every criminal statute that 
makes it a crime to Aunlawfully@ engage in certain conduct does 
precisely that by using the term Aunlawfully@ to incorporate absence-
of-justification by reference.  It follows, therefore, that an actor who 
commits  the actus reus within a two-step statute but possesses a 
justification under the statute has the same substantive defense as an 
actor who fails to commit the actus reus of an offense within a one-
step statute.  Each can rightly claim that, as measured by the harms or 
risks that the statute declares to be regrettable, all things considered, 
he did nothing wrong. 
In sum, when I speak of Ajustification,@ I use it in the same way 
North Dakota does:  I use it to refer to a claim by a defendant that in 
so far as he effectuated the harm or risk that an actus reus prohibits,  
 
statute in Martin v. Ohio. 
24 See Glanville Williams, Offences and Defenses, 2 LEGAL STUDIES 233 
(1982).  But see George Fletcher, The Nature of Justifications,"in John Gardner, 
Jeremy Horder, and Stephen Shute., eds., ACTION AND VALUE IN 
CRIMINAL LAW 175-86 (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1993, pp. 175-86). John 
Gardner concedes Glanville Williams= point as a formal matter.  But he argues 
that because choice-of-evil defenses are often complex or vague, the decision to 
proceed in one step rather than two threatens to jeopardize the Arule of law@ by 
transforming offenses that would otherwise be  clear and easy for the public to 
follow into offenses that are too complex or vague for the public to understand.  
See Gardner, Justifications and Reasons, pp. 118, 125-26.  However, even if one 
believes  that choice-of-evils defenses are more complex or vague than actus reus 
defenses (and I do not), and even if one believes that the rule of law is less 
concerned with choice-of-evil defenses than with actus reus defenses (and, again, 
I do not), it does not follow that proceeding in one step leaves the public with 
less guidance than two steps. After all, the actus reus elements with which 
Gardner is concerned remain precisely the same and precisely as clear when 
located in a one-step statute as when located in a two-step statute, and the 
choice-of-law defenses remain precisely as complex or vague.  If the public can 
follow the actus reus when it is located in two-step statute, it can follow the actus 
reus when it is located in a one-step statute. 
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he was allowed to do so because  the harm or risk he effectuated was 
no greater than the alternative evil that he would have had to choose 
under the dilemmatic circumstances in which he found himself.  This 
usage of Ajustification@ is normatively significant because it ultimately 
rests on the same normative principle that underlies the defense of 
lack of actus reus.25 As we have seen, the defense of lack of actus reus 
arises with respect to two kinds of offenses: offenses like murder and 
drug sales that are predicated on the occurrence of regrettable harms 
or risks and, hence, are subject to choice-of-evils defenses; and 
offenses like attempt that are not premised upon the occurrence of 
regrettable harms or risks (and, hence, are not subject to choice-of-
evils defenses) but rather are premised upon an actor=s undesirable 
readiness to bring about regrettable harms or risks.  In both instances, 
the actus reus is conduct the state regards as regrettable or undesirable 
under the circumstances.  In both instances, therefore, the defense of 
lack of actus reus rests on the  principle that an actor who is charged 
with having engaged in conduct that a criminal statute declares to be 
regrettable or undesirable cannot be justly blamed if he did no such 
thing -- that is, if he did not engage in that regrettable or undesirable 
conduct. The same thing is true of the defenses of justification in 
North Dakota.  The latter defenses specify the circumstances in 
which harms or risks that North Dakota regards as prima facie 
regrettable cease to be regrettable, all things considered.  Defenses of 
justification in North Dakota thus rest on the  principle that an actor 
who is charged with having produced a harm or risk that the state 
regrets, all things considered, cannot be justly blamed if he produced 
no such harm or risk, all things considered. 
 Now if everything is this easy, why the controversy?  Why are 
commentators so divided about the relationship between justification 
and excuse?  The reason is that the defenses that most penal codes 
provide under the rubric of  Ajustification@ are not the choice-of-evils 
defenses that we have thus far discussed.  That is, they are not 
defenses like North Dakota=s that arise when an actor=s commission of 
the actus reus of an offense is actually lesser than, or equal to, the 
 
25 Cf.  Heidi Hurd, Justification and Excuse, Wrongdoing and Culpability, 74 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1551, 1561 (1999). 
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alternative evil he would otherwise have to commit.  Rather, they are 
defenses that arise when an actor believes that his commission of the 
actus reus of an offense is lesser than, or equal to, the alternative evil 
he would otherwise have to commit.  Take the Model Penal Code.  
Like North Dakota, the MPC provides a defense of what it calls 
Ajustification@ that comes into play once the actus reus of an offense is 
complete.  But unlike North Dakota, an actor has such a defense 
when he believes that commission of the actus reus is necessary to 
prevent certain alternative evils.26 (I shall hereinafter refer to North 
Dakota=s usage as the Achoice-of-evils defense,@ and the MPC=s usage  
as the Abelief@ defense).  
The fact that penal codes use Ajustification@ differently has two 
unfortunate consequences B one terminological, the other 
substantive.  The terminological consequence  is that the same word 
ends up referring to different substantive defenses, and different words 
end up referring to the same substantive defense.  To illustrate the  
problem of using Ajustification@ to refer to different defenses, suppose 
that an actor uses lethal force against  an aggressor under 
circumstances in which he actually must use lethal force to protect 
himself from being wrongfully killed or seriously wounded and in 
which he also reasonably believes he must do so.  In that event, North 
Dakota and the MPC would both acquit the actor, and they would 
both do so in the name of Ajustification,@ but they would mean very 
different things by it: North Dakota would mean that the actor 
actually had to use lethal force to protect himself, even if he didn=t
believe he had to use lethal force; while the MPC would mean that 
the actor believed he had to use lethal force, even if actually he didn=t
have to use such force.    
Consider now a case in which different terms are used to refer 
to the same substantive defense.  Thus, suppose that the following 
case arises both in North Dakota and under the MPC: 
 
26 See Model Penal Code ' 3.02(1).  But see Paul Robinson, Competing 
Theories of Justification: Deeds vs. Reasons, in HARM AND CULPABILITY 54 (A.P. 
Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds., 1996), persuasively criticized in Berman, 
Justification and Excuse, at 42-43 & nn. 83-84. 
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Mistaken Self-Defense 
John, who is openly gay within a 
homophobic community, has been 
physically assaulted many times 
because of his sexual orientation, 
sometimes very brutally.  To protect 
himself from such attacks in the 
future, John qualifies for and carries a 
concealed weapon.  Unaware that 
John is armed, John=s co-workers  play 
a prank on him by hiring three young 
actors who dress like thugs and, while 
wielding tire irons, grab John outside a 
gay bar and threaten to lynch him.  
Unfortunately, before the actors can 
reveal the prank, John pulls out his 
gun and, in the reasonable belief that 
his life is in danger, shoots and kills 
one of them.   
 
North Dakota and the MPC would both acquit John, and they 
would do so for the same reason  -- namely, that despite the fact that 
John regrettably killed a person who was no real threat to him, John 
nevertheless acted in good faith and, hence, is not blameworthy.  But 
North Dakota and the MPC use different terms to refer to the 
defense.  The MPC would say that because John believed he had to 
kill in self-defense even though he didn=t, he was Ajustified.@27 In 
contrast, given that John did not have to kill in self-defense, North 
Dakota would deny that he was Ajustified@ but rule that because John 
 reasonably believed he had to kill in self-defense, he was Aexcused.@28
The more significant problem is substantive rather than 
merely terminological.  By equating Ajustification@ with the Abelief 
defense,@ jurisdictions become unable to draw North Dakota=s
distinction between justification and excuse.  And being unable to 
 
27 Model Penal Code ' 3.04. 
28 North Dakota 12.1-05-08 (2003). 
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draw the distinction, they adopt defenses of justification that are 
normatively inconsistent with their definitions of actus reus.29 To 
illustrate, suppose that the following cases arise in North Dakota and 
under the MPC alike:   
 
Murder. Jim, a hitman, deliberately  
shoots at Victim with the intention of 
killing him, and he succeeds.   
Attempted Murder. Jim 2d , also a 
hitman, deliberately shoots at a Victim 
2d with the intention of killing Victim 
2d but, because Victim 2d is wearing a 
bulletproof vest, Jim 2d merely wounds 
him.   
Unwitting Self-Defense. Jim 3d, also a 
hitman, deliberately shoots at an old 
enemy Victim 3d with the intention of 
killing him, and he succeeds B only to 
discover afterwards that if he had 
waited a moment longer, Victim 3d 
would have shot and killed him first  
 
North Dakota and the MPC would reach the same results in 
AMurder@ and AAttempted Murder@ and for the same reasons.  North 
Dakota and the MPC would rule that although Jim and Jim 2d both 
possessed the same guilty minds, Jim committed an actus reus 
consisting of the material harm of homicide, while Jim 2d committed 
an actus reus consisting merely of a readiness to inflict such harm.  
And North Dakota and the MPC  would both reason that the actus 
reus of murder warrants higher penalties than the actus reus of 
attempted murder.  The substantive difference arises with respect to 
 
29 Paul Robinson is the most original and powerful exponent of the view that 
justification ought to be defined by reference to an actor=s actual conduct (which 
Robinson refers to as Adeed@) rather than an actor=s beliefs (which Robinson 
refers to as Areasons@).  See Paul Robinson, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN 
CRIMINAL LAW 100-24. 
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AUnwitting Self-Defense.@ North Dakota would acquit Jim 3d of 
murder, reasoning that because Jim 3d=s killing of Victim 3d was 
actually necessary to protect himself from being wrongly killed, the 
killing was a Ajustified@ choice of evil.  At the same time, however, 
North Dakota would presumably convict Jim 3d of attempted murder,
reasoning that although Jim 3d failed to bring about the evil of 
unjustified homicide, he was guilty of trying to do so.30 In contrast, 
the MPC would convict Jim 3d of murder rather than attempted 
murder, on the ground that when Jim 3d intentionally killed Victim 
3d, he did so without believing that it was necessary to protect himself 
and, hence, without what the MPC requires for Ajustification.@
Notice that North Dakota=s decision in Unwitting Self-
Defense to acquit Jim 3d of murder but convict him of attempted 
murder is consistent with both its reasoning and the MPC=s reasoning 
in Murder and Attempted Murder.  After all, the reason that North 
Dakota and the MPC both acquit his predecessor, Jim 2d, of murder 
and convict him of attempted murder is that, although Jim 2d tried 
his best to inflict a wrongful death that North Dakota and the MPC 
wished to prevent, he failed to do so.  The same thing is true of Jim 3d 
in Unwitting Self-Defense: Jim 3d tried his best to inflict a wrongful 
death but, like Jim 2d, he failed.  Instead, he inflicted a harm that was 
lesser than or equal to the harm he would have otherwise suffered 
and, hence, a harm that neither North Dakota nor the MPC seeks to 
prevent under the circumstances.  And North Dakota rules 
accordingly by treating Jim 3d as an attempted murderer.   In 
contrast, the MPC=s resolution of Unwitting Self-Defense is 
inconsistent with its reasoning in Murder and Attempted Murder, 
because in the latter two cases, the MPC takes into account whether 
an actor succeeds in inflicting the harm he intends, while in 
Unwitting Self-Defense it does not.31
30 It will be recalled that the defense of Achoice of evils@ does not apply to 
crimes like criminal attempt, because the choice-of-evils defense only applies to 
offenses like murder and drug sales that are defined by reference to resulting 
harms or risks.  See note _____, supra. 
31 John Gardner makes a point of distinguishing the Aobjective@ nature of  
justification from the Aobjective@ question whether punishment should be made 
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Now one might argue  that Unwitting Self-Defense differs 
from Attempted Murder precisely in that the former involves the 
harm of homicide while the latter does not.  Of course, it is true that 
like all  choices of evils, Unwitting Self-Defense does involve the 
inflicting of an evil.  The point, however, is that when an actor inflicts 
an evil that is lesser than or equal to the evil that would otherwise 
befall him, the evil he inflicts is not a wrongful evil.  It is not an evil 
that the state wishes he had refrained from inflicting under the 
circumstances, and, hence, it is not an evil that the state regrets, all 
things considered.  Indeed, if the MPC regretted the evil that Jim 3d 
actually inflicted, i.e., the evil of killing a person who would otherwise 
have killed him, the MPC would not offer defenses of Ajustification@ to 
 actors who  know full well what harm they are doing and 
intentionally inflict it.  Alternatively, it might be argued that the 
MPC is right to judge Jim 3d on the basis of what he believed he was 
doing because states ought to judge actors on what they undertake 
rather than on what  fortuitously ensues.  This is not the place to 
debate the much mooted question whether criminal punishment 
ought to be based solely upon the intentions with which a person acts 
and not at all upon resulting harms.  For even if one takes that 
position (and I, for one, do not),32 that is not what the MPC achieves. 
 The MPC and North Dakota both believe that results signify, which 
is why they both distinguish between murder and attempted murder, 
and why their differing positions on justification ought to matter to 
them.  The difference between them is that while North Dakota holds 
Jim 3d responsible solely for attempted murder precisely because he 
did not bring about the kind of wrongful harm for which it reserves 
the offense of murder, the MPC=s definition of Ajustification@misleads 
 
to depend upon the bad luck of resulting harm. Gardner, Justifications and 
Reasons, pp. 104-05.  In doing so, however, he obscures the fact that the only 
reason it matters to defendants whether justification is defined objectively as 
North Dakota defines it or also subjectively as Gardner and the MPC define it is 
that defining it in the former fashion enables a jurisdiction to take account of 
what is distinction in cases like the Unwitting Self-Defender, namely, that the 
defendant had the Aluck@ not to have caused objective harm. 
32 See Peter Westen, Some Commonplace Confusions Regarding Consent in Rape 
Cases, 2 OHIO STATE CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW (Fall, 2004, forthcoming). 
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it into punishing Jim 3d for a crime of wrongful harm, even though for 
he did not inflict a harm that the MPC regrets under the 
circumstances. 
 
C.  Excuse 
 AExcuse,@ as I define it,  encompasses all exculpatory defenses 
that do not consist of either absence of actus reus or justification.  
That is, it encompasses all instances in which an actor can rightly 
claim, AEven if I committed the actus reus of the offense with which I 
am charged, and whether or not I committed it without justification,  
I did not do so while in possession of features that the law requires for 
a person to be held blameworthy for doing so.@33
This usage is broader than one finds elsewhere.  Some 
commentators confine Aexcuse@ to defenses such as insanity, 
involuntariness, and immaturity that come into play after a person 
concedes, at least arguendo, that he not only committed the actus reus 
of an offense while possessed of the  mens rea the charged offense 
requires, whether the latter  consists of purpose, knowledge, 
recklessness, negligence or some other mental condition.34 My usage 
of Aexcuse@ is broader in two respects.  First, with respect to persons 
who concede, at least arguendo, that they committed the actus reus of 
an offense, I use Aexcuse@ to encompass not only  absences of 
 
33 Douglas Husak challenges the conventional view that the defense of 
justification is logically and normatively  prior to the defense of excuse.  See 
Douglas Husak, On the Supposed Priority of Justification to Excuse (manuscript).  
Husak argues, instead, that, although excuse is a defense that comes into play 
only after an actor commits an offense (including elements of actus reus and mens 
rea), it is not a defense that comes into play only after an actor commits an 
unjustified offense.  I find Husak=s argument entirely persuasive, with one minor 
exception.  Because I shall be asserting that excuse encompasses the defense of 
lack of mens rea, I say, contrary to Husak,  that although excuse is, indeed, a 
defense that comes into play only after an actor commits the actus reus of an 
offense, it is not a defense that comes into play only after an actor does so with 
mens rea.
34 See Paul Robinson, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF CRIMINAL LAW at 
81-83.  
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responsibility such as insanity, immaturity, and involuntary 
intoxication, but also absences of the mens rea that  charged offenses 
require, including defenses of mistake of law and mistake of fact.35
Second, I use Aexcuse,@ as North Dakota does, to refer to actors like 
John in AMistaken Self-Defense@ who mistakenly believe that their 
conduct is actually necessary to prevent a greater evil under the 
circumstances.  Like North Dakota (but unlike the Model Penal 
Code), I would say of John, AHe has no claim of justification, because 
he brought about a state of affairs that the state regards as regrettable 
 under the circumstances.  But he is excused because although he did 
a bad thing, he did not do it with a guilty mind.@
Of course, commentators are free to define Aexcuse@ in any 
way they wish.  Ultimately, however, the measure of a definition is its 
perspicuousness.  The perspicuousness of a definition of excuse is a 
function of the degree to which it revealingly includes defenses that 
are normatively alike while excluding defenses that are normatively 
unalike. I will try to show in part IV that, by that measure, an 
attitudinal theory of excuses is superior to the competing theories 
discussed in part III. 
 
II.  A CHALLENGE TO ALL NORMATIVE THEORIES OF AEXCUSE@
All normative theories of excuse, including those I discuss in 
part III and my own in part IV, rest on a shared assumption that  
Aexcuse@ is a normative set that can be coherently and meaningfully 
distinguished from Ajustification.@ Most commentators who write 
about justification and excuse make that assumption, though they 
differ, and sometimes heatedly, as to what the distinction is.  A few 
commentators, however, engage in a more radical critique.  They 
challenge the very possibility of fashioning a normative theory of 
Aexcuse@ in contradistinction to Ajustification@ because they deny that 
 
35 Accordingly, because Aexcuse@ concedes, at least arguendo, that an actor is 
 guilty of the actus reus of an offense,  it does not refer to defenses of mens rea 
with respect to offenses like attempt in which mens rea is constitutive of actus 
reus. 
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any such distinction exists.36 I shall discuss two such critiques B those 
of Kent Greenawalt, and Mitchell Berman. 
 
A.  Kent Greenawalt 
Kent Greenawalt wrote a celebrated article in 1985 criticizing 
efforts to distinguish justification and excuse in law, and he later 
revisited and expanded upon his criticisms on two occasions.37 Some 
of Greenawalt=s criticisms are irrelevant to our inquiry because they 
are confined to proposed distinctions between justification and excuse 
 that I reject for the same reasons he does.  Thus, Greenawalt 
criticizes the coherence and practicality of distinctions between 
Ajustification@ and Aexcuse@ that are based upon the following:  
whether conduct is Apositively desirable@ as opposed to Awrongful;@38
whether an actor reasonably believes he is choosing a lesser evil (even 
if mistakenly) as opposed to unreasonably believing it;39 whether a 
defense is general and objective as opposed to individual and subjective;40
and whether third persons are permitted to assist the actor (as 
opposed to being prohibited from assisting him) and whether they and 
the victim are prohibited from resisting him (as opposed to being 
permitted to resist him).41 The distinction I propose does not possess 
any of these  features and, hence, is not subject to criticisms that are 
confined to them.  Rather, I argue that conduct is Ajustified@ not only 
when it is positively desirable but also when it is not undesirable and, 
hence, merely permitted;42 that conduct  is justified not by virtue of an 
 
36 See, e.g., Corrado, Notes on the Structure of a Theory of Excuses, pp. 492-93. 
37 See Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 
COLUM. L. REV. 1847 (1984)(hereinafter APerplexing Borders@); Kent 
Greenawalt, Distinguishing Justifications from Excuses, 49 LAW AND 
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 89 (1986); Kent Greenawalt, Justifications, Excuses, 
and a Model Penal Code for Democratic Societies, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ETHICS 14 
(Winter/Spring 1998). 
38 See Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, at p. 1899, 1906. 
39 See Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, pp. 1907-11. 
40 See Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, pp. 1915-18. 
41 See Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, pp. 1918-27. 
42 See Westen and Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress, pp. 866-72, 
883-88.  Cf. Joshua Dressler, New Thoughts About the Concept of Justification in 
Criminal Law, 32 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 61, 81-87 (1984). 
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actor=s believing the alternative to be a greater evil but by virtue of the 
alternative actually being a greater evil; that the measure of relative 
evils (and, hence, the existence of justification) can be a function of 
subjective factors in the form of role-based or agent-relative 
considerations that shape an actor=s legitimate interests  in acting one 
way as opposed to another;43 and that the presence of justification 
does not determine whether third parties may assist an actor, nor does 
the presence of excuse determine whether third parties and an actor=s
victim may resist him.44
Some of Greenawalt=s other criticisms are also irrelevant 
because they are confined to certain aims for distinguishing between 
justification and excuse that I do not share.  Thus, Greenawalt argues 
that because of the rightful role of general verdicts in jury trials, jury 
instructions based upon distinctions between justification and excuse 
will do nothing to clarify jury verdicts.45 He also argues that jury 
instructions that are based upon the terms Ajustification@ and 
Aexcuse,@ and instructions that require jurors to agree on individual 
defenses of justification and excuse, will only complicate jury 
deliberations.46 I agree.  My aim in distinguishing between 
justification and excuse is not to bring greater clarity to general 
criminal verdicts.  Nor is it to instruct juries in the language of 
Ajustification@ and Aexcuse.@ Nor is it to require that jurors agree that 
individual defenses of justification and excuse exist where they can 
agree that either one or the other of such defenses exist.  To be sure, 
jurors need to  understand the elements of the criminal  defenses they 
apply, whether the defenses consist of  insanity, mistake of law, 
necessity or duress.  But they need not be told that the reason the law 
recognizes insanity is that it is an excuse, and that by virtue of being 
an excuse, it shares something in common with mistake of law.  Nor 
need they be told that they must agree on whether a certain defense 
 
43 See Westen and Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress, pp. 864-72. 
44 See Westen and Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress, pp. 869-72, 
917-21 
45 Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, at 1900-01. 
46 Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, p. 1902, 1910-11; Greenawalt, Justifications, 
Excuses, and a Model Penal Code for Democratic Societies, pp. 17-18. 
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(of justification) exists before they may agree on whether a certain 
defense (of excuse)exists, provided that it suffices that they agree that 
either one or the other exists.       
Nevertheless, some of the criticisms that Greenawalt directs to 
other distinctions between justification and excuse do apply to my 
own.  And among the aims he dismisses for distinguishing between 
them is one that I embrace.  Specifically, he believes it is generally 
Acounter-productive@ for lawmakers -- that is, legislators who must  
enact defenses and judges who must construe and fashion them -- to 
try to ground their lawmaking in the distinction between justification 
and excuse.47 In contrast, I believe that lawmakers who are engaged in 
fashioning new exculpatory defenses or clarifying existing exculpatory 
defenses can only benefit by asking themselves, AWhat is the basis for 
this defense?  Is it that  actors who invoke the defense have produced 
no harm or risk that the state regards as regrettable for persons in their 
circumstances to have produced  -- nothing, that is, the state wishes 
such persons had done otherwise under the circumstances?  Or is it 
that, regardless of whether actors who invoke the defense have 
engaged in conduct the state regards as regrettable or undesirable for 
persons in their circumstances to have performed, they lacked certain 
additional features that must obtain for  persons to be blameworthy for 
such conduct?@48
Greenawalt has  three objections to the kind of distinction I 
propose.  His first objection is linguistic.  It departs from ordinary 
language to use Ajustification@ in law for conduct that is merely 
permissible, he says, because Ajustification@ is usually used in moral 
discourse to refer to conduct that is positively desirable.  I=m not sure 
Greenawalt is right about ordinary language.  Like most people, 
speakers  probably  assume that Adesirable conduct@ and Aundesirable 
conduct@ together occupy the field without leaving any middle ground 
between them.  Once speakers realize that conduct may be neither 
 
47 Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, at 1915.  Nevertheless,  Greenawalt does 
encourage scholars to continue to reflect on the distinction.   See id. at 1901-03, 
1913. 
48 For another critique of Greenawalt, see Hurd, Justification and Excuse, 
Wrongdoing and Culpability.
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desirable nor undesirable but merely permissible, they might, indeed, 
describe permissible conduct as morally Ajustified@ conduct.  Even if 
they did not, however, nothing precludes the law from using 
Ajustification@ as a term of art to encompass both undesirable and 
permissible conduct.  Law students learn early on that words can be 
used differently in law than in ordinary language .49
Greenawalt=s other linguistic objection involves cases that 
North Dakota and I regard as excuses rather than justifications, 
namely, cases  in which an actor reasonably believes that the harm or 
risk he imposes is necessary to avoid a greater evil, only to discover 
afterwards that he was mistaken and that the harm or risk served no 
purpose at all.  Greenawalt concedes that when speakers elaborate 
upon such cases, they qualify their statements by distinguishing 
between the  act and the actor by saying, >The act was not justified, 
but the actor was=.50 But, Greenawalt says, given that states do not 
qualify their statements in that way -- that is, given that states use the 
single label of either Ajustification@ or Aexcuse@ to refer tout coup to 
defenses that such actors possess -- states should use Ajustification@
rather than Aexcuse.@ They should do so, he says, because 
Ajustification@ is a term of Amoral appraisal,@51 and Aif one is concerned 
with judging the actor, the actor=s blameless perception of the facts 
ought to be sufficient to support a justification.@52
Now we have previously seen that within states that use 
Ajustification@ to include what is merely permissible (as opposed to 
desirable), Ajustification@ is not necessarily a term of moral approval.  
But even if Ajustification@ were a term of moral approval, and even 
though the law is concerned with Ajudging@ an actor, it is a non 
sequitur for Greenawalt to conclude that in order to Ajudg[e]@ him, the 
 
49 See Heidi Hurd, Justification and Excuse, Wrongdoing and Culpability, 74 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1551, 1557 (1999)(AWe should thus avoid ham stringing 
our analysis of the distinction between justified and excused actions by an ex 
ante requirement that we use moral language the way that it is used in daily 
gossip . . . .@). 
50 Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, p. 1908. 
51 Greenawalt, Perplexing Problems, p. 1916 n.55. 
52 Greenawalt, Distinguishing Justifications from Excuses,@ at p.  102.  See also 
Greenawalt, Perplexing Problems, p. 1906. 
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law ought to use Ajustification@ to refer to what an actor reasonably 
believes he is doing as opposed to what he actually does. After all, with 
respect to any offense that consists of (1) an actus reus of actual harm 
or risk and (2) mens rea regarding such harm or risk, there are two 
independent grounds on which an actor might be adjudged innocent of 
the offense:  first, on the ground that regardless of any guilty mind he 
may have had, he did not actually bring about the harm or risk that 
the statute declares to be regrettable; and second, on the ground that 
regardless of the regrettable harm or risk he may have actually 
brought about, he reasonably believed otherwise and, hence, lacked a 
guilty mind.  States like North Dakota follow the same approach with 
respect to exculpatory defenses that arise after an actor has 
committed the actus reus of an offense with proscribed mens rea.
North Dakota invokes these two grounds that govern whether actors 
are guilty of offenses and also applies them  to determine whether 
actors are guilty of exculpatory defenses. Thus, with respect to an 
actor who has committed the actus reus of an offense with proscribed 
mens rea, North Dakota is willing to exculpate him on either of two 
alternative grounds, namely: (1) on the ground that, given the choice 
of evils at issue, the actor did not actually bring about a harm or risk 
that the law regrets under the circumstances; or (2) on the ground 
that, although the actor may actually have brought about a harm or 
risk that the law regrets under the circumstances, he reasonably 
believed otherwise and, hence, lacked a guilty mind with respect to 
the choice of evils he believed he faced.  Greenawalt argues that in so 
far as states enact a defense such as #1, they should not call the 
defense Ajustification.@ But the reason Greenawalt gives (i.e., that 
Ajustification@ is a term of Amoral appraisal@ for Ajudging [an] actor@
and therefore should only be used to refer to defenses such as #2) is a 
non sequitur because defenses #1 and #2 are both part of  Ajudging@ an 
actor.  Defense #1, which North Dakota happens to call 
Ajustification,@ judges an actor by what he does; defense #2, which 
North Dakota happens to call Aexcuse,@ judges him further by what he 
reasonably believes he is doing.  Admittedly, if Greenawalt had his way, 
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he would abolish defense #1 altogether.53 But within jurisdictions 
that recognize defenses #1 and #2, calling them Ajustification@ and 
Aexcuse,@ respectively, is entirely consistent, linguistically, with law=s
task of Amak[ing] a judgment about [an] actor.@
Greenawalt also raises a theoretical objection to the 
distinction I would draw.  As the title to his first article suggests, 
Greenawalt devotes much of his attention to demonstrating that 
theoretical distinctions between justification and excuse collapse at 
the Aborderlines@ that should separate them.  Most of his illustrations 
are irrelevant for our purposes, however, because they concern 
distinctions between justification and excuse that I reject, sometimes 
for the same reasons he does.  Nevertheless, Greenawalt offers one 
illustration that is pertinent, namely, the  defense of duress.  An actor 
has a defense under the Model Penal Code to what would otherwise 
be an offense if he was Acoerced@ to commit it by a threat of unlawful 
force against himself or another that Aa person of reasonable firmness 
in his situation would have been unable to resist.@54 Greenawalt 
argues that duress under the MPC is a unitary defense which is stated 
broadly enough to encompass two quite distinct situations, one of 
which is pure justification, and the other of which is pure excuse.  
Duress is pure justification, he says,  when what an actor does is a 
choice-of-evil that in other settings would constitute necessity.  
Duress is an excuse, he says, when what an actor does is not a choice 
of evils that in other settings would constitute necessity and, yet, 
remains exculpatory under the circumstances.  The two examples of 
duress as excuse he gives are:  (1)A[w]hen threats lead people to make 
understandable choices favoring family interest over the equal or 
more powerful interests of strangers;@ and (2) when a coercive threat 
 
53 Greenawalt claims that predicating justification on acts as they actually are 
(rather than on what actors reasonably believe them to be) requires that one  
possess a Acomplex theory of moral judgment.@ Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, p. 
1909 n.34.  But that is not so.  It requires only that, in deciding whether to 
punish an actor, the state possess a legitimate interest in ascertaining, ADid he 
actually do anything that we firmly wish he had not done under the 
circumstances? 
54 Model Penal Code ' 2.09. 
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renders an actor Aincapable of making rational judgments.@55
Greenawalt concludes that because the defense of duress under the 
MPC encompasses both justification and excuse, Asimplicity@ argues in 
favor of retaining a unitary defense rather than teasing out its separate 
strands.56
Greenawalt=s objection is puzzling on several grounds.  First, 
on the assumption that examples 1 and 2 are indeed instances of 
excuse, Greenawalt=s use of duress runs counter to the thrust of his 
article.   Far from showing that the borderland between justification 
and excuse is Ablurred,@57 he argues that duress arises in two contexts -
- one of which is justification, pure and simple, and the other of which 
is excuse, pure and simple.  Second, Greenawalt does not seem to 
believe what he says about the Asimplicity@ of retaining a defense of 
duress that encompasses both justification and excuse because he 
concedes that the Abest@ solution in terms of clarity is to define 
Anecessity@ to encompass all justified choices and to Aprune@ the 
defense of duress to encompass what he believes are solely excuses, 
i.e., examples 1 & 2.58
The more serious problem is Greenawalt=s assumption that 
examples 1 & 2 are instances of excuse B or, indeed, that any instance 
of criminal duress is a non-redundant instance of excuse.  I have 
argued elsewhere that all instances of duress, except for those rare 
cases in which duress is redundant with the defense of 
involuntariness, are justifications and, hence, present no Aborderline@
problems at all.59 Take example 1, i.e., where Athreats lead people to 
make understandable choices favoring family interest over the equal 
or more powerful interests of strangers.@ The existence of Afamily 
 
55 Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, p. 1912 & n.41. 
56 Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, p. 1912. 
57 Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, p. 1902. 
58 Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, p. 1912.  Indeed, the most Greenawalt can 
muster in defense of the MPC rule is that Ahaving a single unified defense of 
duress that reaches justifications and excuses hardly constitutes a breach of any 
fundamental principle of what a criminal code should look like.@ Id. at 1913.  
See also Greenawalt, Distinguishing Justifications from Excuses, p. 104. 
59 See Westen and Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress, 833-950 and 
esp. p. 903 n.129. 
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interest[s]@ are agent-relative interests that the state can take into 
consideration in deciding whether conduct that would otherwise be a 
greater evil under the circumstances is not and, hence, is justified.60
Example 2 is more difficult, because Greenawalt does not clarify what 
he means by a coercive threat that renders an actor Aincapable of 
making rational judgments.@ Greenawalt may be referring to rare 
cases in which an actor is so disconcerted by a coercive threat that, 
like a person swarmed by bees, he acts reflexively rather than assessing 
other people=s interests in relation to his own.  Such cases are rare 
because as an act of coercion, duress is  typically employed by 
wrongdoers who, rather than wagering on an unthinking reflex on 
their victims= part, seek to structure their victims= choices in such a 
way that they decide to save themselves at the expense of others.  In 
any event, the defense of duress is superfluous in cases of unthinking 
reflex because the latter are fully addressed by the defense of 
Ainvoluntariness,@ just as they are when an actor is swarmed by bees.  
It is more likely, therefore, that Greenawalt is referring to cases in 
which an actor chooses an evil that would be unjustified if the 
alternative evil were natural in origin rather than the purposeful 
imposition of a coercive malefactor.  However, the reason the defense 
of duress is broader than the defense of necessity is not that the 
defense duress excuses actors from blame for doing what the state 
firmly believes is a greater evil under the circumstances, but that the 
very features that distinguish duress from necessity (i.e., that the 
threats of duress are human in origin, wrongful, and coercive) 
contribute to their evil in the eyes of the state and, hence, render 
conduct on an actor=s part that would otherwise be a greater evil not a 
greater evil under the circumstances.61 The MPC=s standard of 
 
60 Indeed, Greenawalt seems to concede as much.  See Greenawalt, 
Perplexing Borders, p. 1915-16 (AIf "the situation" is defined broadly enough, it may 
include roles and relational characteristics; so perhaps their relevance to 
justification  is not at odds with the idea that justifications are general and 
objective@). 
 
61 See Westen and Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress, pp. 931-44. 
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Areasonable firmness@ captures those features.  AReasonable firmness@
is not average firmness or typical firmness.  It is normatively appropriate 
and proportional firmness in the context of a human, wrongful, and 
purposefully coercive threats.62 An actor has a defense of duress if, 
and only if, his conduct is justified under the circumstances -- that is, 
only if his choice is one that the state regards as a normatively 
permissible choice for an actor to make, given the human, wrongful, 
and purposeful coercion to which he was subjected. 
Greenawalt makes one further theoretical objection.  He uses 
a simple case of assault to ask, >If distinguishing between justification 
and excuse is supposedly so useful in analyzing defenses, why is it that 
we have no need for the distinction in analyzing offenses?= Thus, he 
says, suppose that without realizing Ben is nearby, Ann swings her 
arm and hits Ben, within a jurisdiction that makes it an offense for an 
actor to intentionally strike a person without the latter=s consent.  
The law does not need complicated distinctions such as justification 
and excuse to dispose of Ann=s claim, Greenawalt says.  It simply 
determines that she did not have the mental state required by the 
statute, i.e., intention, and, hence, is not guilty. 
 
As long as Ann was unaware that she 
might hit Ben, she has not committed 
an assault, and the criminal law does 
not engage in labeling to decide 
whether her arm swinging was justified 
or only excused. 
If the law=s failure to label acts that do 
not amount to crimes is acceptable, 
then the question arises whether  a 
failure to label precisely is 
unacceptable when other 
circumstances preclude liability.  If the 
law need not determine whether Ann 
is justified or excused when she 
 
62 See Westen and Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress, pp. 906-12. 
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accidentally hits Ben, why need it 
determine precisely whether she is 
justified or excused when she strikes in 
mistaken self-defense?63
Ironically, the legal situation is precisely the opposite.  Rather 
than treating offenses differently from the way states like North 
Dakota treat defenses, the law treats them the same B causing Ann to 
be treated in a way that illustrates the very point Greenawalt seeks to 
refute.  The law asks two things of Ann: (1) ADid Ann commit the 
actus reus of assault inflicting the undesirable harm of striking Ben 
without his consent?@ (2) AIf so, did Ann lack the kind of mens rea 
that renders a person blameworthy under the statute for doing the 
undesirable thing she did?@ The first question parallels North 
Dakota=s inquiry into justification by exonerating actors on the 
ground that they did nothing the law at hand regards as a harm to be 
eschewed under the circumstances.  The second question parallels 
North Dakota=s inquiry into excuse by exonerating actors on the 
ground that, while they did undesirable things,  they lacked a feature 
that the law requires to render them blameworthy.  Ann is exculpated 
in law not without reference to notions of justification and excuse, but 
precisely by virtue of being Aexcused@64 for having done an undesirable 
thing. 
Greenawalt=s final objection is political in nature.  He argues 
that it is politically undesirable to expect lawmakers to reduce the 
Acomplexity and diversity of a society=s moral views@65 regarding 
defenses to a single, binary distinction between justification and 
excuse.  To illustrate, he hypothesizes a drafting committee of three 
 
63 Greenawalt, Distinguishing Between Justifications and Excuses, p. 108.  See 
also Greenawalt, Justifications, Excuses, and a Model Penal Code for Democratic 
Societies, p. 21. 
64 Greenawalt, Distinguishing Justifications From Excuses, p. 198 (AIf Ann=s
swinging arm injures Ben, she might offer an excuse, saying: AI=m sorry, but I 
didn=t realize you were there@)(emphasis added). 
65 Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, p. 1903.  See also Greenawalt, Distinguishing 
Justifications from Excuses, p. 107. 
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legislators who together must decide whether homeowners ought to 
have a duty of retreat, that is, whether homeowners may use deadly 
force in defense of their homes even where they could safely retreat 
instead.  Legislator 1 regards it as positively desirable for homeowners 
to stand their ground rather than retreat; Legislator 2 balks at saying 
that it is positively desirable for homeowners to stand their ground 
when they can safely retreat, but nevertheless believes it is morally 
permissible for homeowners to do so;  Legislator 3 believes that it is 
wrong for homeowners to stand their ground when they can safely 
retreat, but he is (i) A[unwilling] to impose his moral conviction 
[upon his constituents] and demand behavior that many people find 
unnatural,@ and (ii) Askeptical of the capacity of jurors to determine 
when someone knows he can retreat safely.@66 The three legislators 
differ sharply in their moral assessments of retreat, and, yet, they agree 
that  homeowners should be able to stand their ground without fear of 
criminal liability.  However, Greenawalt says,  if they must first decide 
 whether to classify their reasons as Ajustification@ or Aexcuse,@ the 
task will not only Atake a lot of time and energy,@ it will fail to capture 
their Adivergen[t] moral evaluations@ of retreat.67
Greenawalt=s argument may have force with respect to other 
distinctions between justification and excuse.  However, with respect 
to the distinction I propose, his  illustration suggests that rather than 
being a political vice, distinguishing between justification and excuse 
can be a political virtue.  Despite their differences, the three 
legislators all have reasons of Ajustification@ for rejecting a duty of 
retreat (though, as we shall see,  Legislator 3 may also have reasons of 
Aexcuse,@ though if he does, his reasons are highly problematic in 
criminal law).  The three legislators all have reasons of justification 
because, measured by the basic question, AHas the actor inflicted a 
harm or risk that the state regards as regrettable under the 
circumstances?@, they all agree that a homeowner who uses lethal 
force rather than retreat does nothing regrettable.  Thus, because 
 
66 Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, p. 1906.  See also Greenawalt, Distinguishing 
Justification from Excuse, p. 107; Greenawalt, Justifications, Excuses, and a Model 
Penal Code for Democratic Societies, pp. 18-19. 
67 Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, p. 1903, 1906, 1914. 
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Legislator 1 believes that standing one=s ground is positively desirable, 
he would deny that it is regrettable; because Legislator 2 believes that 
standing one=s ground is morally permissible, he would also deny that 
it is regrettable; and although Legislator 3 believes that it would be 
regrettable for homeowners to stand their ground if the law could 
accurately determine after-the-fact that they could have retreated 
with complete safety, Legislator 3does not believe the law can 
accurately make such determinations after-the fact and, therefore, 
believes that to avoid convicting homeowners whose actions were not 
regrettable, the law must adopt a prophylactic rule that treats all 
homeowners as if standing their ground were not regrettable. 
Now what about Legislator 3's other reason for rejecting a duty 
to retreat, viz., that despite personally believing it to be morally wrong 
for homeowners to stand their ground when they can safely retreat, he 
is  A[unwilling] to impose his moral conviction [upon his constituents] 
and demand behavior that many people find unnatural.@ It is not 
clear what Greenawalt means in contrasting Legislator 3's personal 
moral convictions with those of his constituents.  Nor is it clear what 
Greenawalt means in saying that  the legislator=s constituents find a 
duty of retreat Aunnatural.@ If Greenawalt means that while 
Legislator 3 personally regards it as wrong for homeowners to stand 
their ground rather than retreat, he  feels duty-bound to represent his 
constituents who in general do not think it is wrong, then, again, 
Legislator 3's reasons are reasons of justification; because in rejecting 
a duty to retreat, Legislator 3 is speaking for constituents who do not 
regard standing one=s ground as regrettable.  However, Greenawalt 
may mean something else.  He may mean that while Legislator 3 
believes his constituents agree with him that standing one=s ground is 
wrong, Legislator 3 also believes that most of his constituents, being 
morally weak, would probably end up doing the wrong thing if they 
themselves were in that situation.  If that is Legislator 3's stance, the 
defense he would be enacting would, indeed, be an excuse rather than 
a justification.  Nevertheless, Greenawalt is wrong to argue that 
Legislator 3 should not have to confront his reason as a  putative 
excuse.  On the contrary, it is politically desirable that Legislator 3 
confront what codifying such a excuse would mean, because it would 
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force Legislator 3 to recognize that he would be creating an excuse 
without precedent in criminal law -- namely, an excuse consisting of 
the claim, AMost people would do the same thing under the 
circumstances.@ Now it might be thought that the MPC defense of 
duress does precisely that in its reference to people of Areasonable 
firmness.@ But that is not so.  The MPC defense of duress is not 
predicated on polls as what most people actually do.  If it were, the 
defense ought to be generalized to exonerate automobile drivers  who, 
being late, exceed speed limits; employees who under financial 
pressure steal office supplies from their employers; taxpayers who 
under financial pressure fudge on their taxes; people who loot in the 
context of urban riots; concentration camp guards who commit 
crimes against humanity; and ethnic groups that run amok in the 
context of ethnic cleansing.  The defense of duress is predicated on 
what a Areasonable@ person would do, a Areasonable@ person being not 
an average person but a right-minded person who, when confronted 
with a coercive threat of personal  injury to himself or loved ones, 
maintains a normatively acceptable balance between his self interests 
and the interests of others. 
 
B.  Mitchell Berman. 
On its face, Mitchell Berman=s critique of prevailing 
distinctions between justification and excuse appears to be more 
radical than Greenawalt=s.  Greenawalt, after all, concedes that there 
are paradigmatic cases in law and morals in which the normative 
distinction between justification and excuse is both clear and 
significant; and Greenawalt thus confines his objections to 
Aborderline@ cases in which he believes that the normative distinction 
breaks down, though Greenawalt fails to explain how the normative 
distinction can be significant in some cases without resting on norms 
that are significant generally.  In contrast, Berman seems to deny that 
there is any normative content to the distinction at all between 
justification and excuse because he denies that the distinction can be 
a Amoral@ one.68 This is not to say that Berman rejects all distinctions 
 
68 Berman, Justification and Excuse, Law and Morality, 53 DUKE L.J.  1, 8-10  
(2003). 
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between justification and excuse.  Berman  argues that there is a 
certain conceptual distinction between justification and excuse that  
represents, in turn, a kind of Anormative@ distinction.69 But he argues 
that the substantive norms that the conceptual distinction represents 
are Asociological@70 norms rather than Amoral@ norms.  He thus seems 
to deny what every other commentator who writes about justification 
and excuse assumes -- namely, that justification stands for conduct 
that is right and good (or at least not wrong and bad ), and that 
excuse stands for conduct that is wrongful but blameless.     
In reality, however, Berman=s critique is not what it seems. 
Berman does not deny that the distinction between justification and 
excuse in law is a normative distinction between conduct that is not 
wrongful, on the one hand, and conduct that is wrongful but 
blameless, on the other.  Indeed, the Asociological@ inquiry that  his 
own definition of Ajustification@ requires is an inquiry into what  
jurisdictions wish their citizens to aspire to do.71 Rather, when 
Berman denies that justification and excuse can represent Amoral@
judgments in law, he is using Amoral@ and Asociological@ in non-
standard ways to make a different point that can scarcely be disputed. 
 I shall first address the portion of Berman=s article that appears to 
speak to normative distinctions between justification and excuse such 
as mine.  I will then say something about the merits of his own 
Aconceptual@ distinction between justification and excuse. 
Berman sets up what he calls the Astandard account@ of 
justification and excuse in law, namely, that legally justified conduct 
is conduct that is not Amorally wrongful,@ while legally excused 
conduct is conduct that is Amorally wrongful@ but nevertheless 
morally Ablameless.@72 He then proceeds to argue that the standard 
account is and will continue to be fundamentally  inconsistent with 
the shape of criminal law defenses.  In doing so, however, Berman 
reveals that far from criticizing a Aconsensus@ view, he is criticizing a 
strawman that, as far as I can tell,  no one would embrace.  Berman 
 
69 Berman, Justification and Excuse, pp. 5, 10, 24-25, 30-31, 48. 
70 Berman, Justification and Excuse, pp. 30-31, 37. 
71 Berman, Justification and Excuse, pp. 32-33. 
72 Berman, Justification and Excuse, pp. 7-9. 
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reveals that he is not denying that justified conduct is conduct that is 
not normatively wrongful.  Nor is Berman denying that excused 
conduct is conduct that is normatively wrongful but not normatively 
blameworthy.  Rather, he is making the non-controversial assertion 
that the kinds of normative judgments of right and wrong, blameless 
and blameworthy, that enter into judgments of justification and 
excuse in law are not necessarily the same as they would be in ethics.
That is to say, in denying that there is a Amoral@ basis to the 
distinction between justification and excuse in law, Berman is stating 
what most law students discover early in on,  namely, that the legal 
rules that govern the state=s official condemnation of its citizens are 
not, and ought not to be, identical to the ethical norms that govern 
people=s personal reproaches of one another. 
Legal norms of state-imposed punishment differ from personal 
norms of interpersonal reproach because, even if they have common 
origins, the institutions and sanctions of state-imposed punishment 
differ significantly from those of interpersonal reproach.  Interpersonal 
reproof is just that: it is personal and typically private or semi-private; 
while official condemnation is purposefully impersonal and 
purposefully public.  Individuals who reproach one another typically 
know one another and, if they make mistakes, can correct them; 
while the institutions of official punishment are state officials and 
random jurors with no personal knowledge of the events and little 
ability to correct mistakes.  The sanctions of personal reproach are 
gradational and relatively mild, ranging from a raised eye-brow to 
verbal chastisement to social ostracism; while the sanctions of official 
punishment are crude and severe, ranging from public condemnation 
to incarceration to death.  Accordingly, even if lawmakers and the 
public started with identical senses of  wrongdoing and blame, one 
would expect the official rules of criminal law to differ from the 
ethical rules of interpersonal relationships.  Nevertheless, the fact that 
lawmakers end up making different judgments of wrongdoing and 
blame in the criminal context than they and the public make in 
interpersonal contexts does not prevent their judgments in law from 
being judgments of wrongdoing and blame. 
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Consider a case in which a 6-year, 11-month-old boy 
purposefully breaks all of his sister=s porcelain dolls or tortures a family 
pet.  The boy=s parents will rightly behave differently than the juvenile 
courts.  The parents, who are intimate with the boy=s motivation, may 
well scold him, demand that he apologize, and impose other domestic 
sanctions, while continuing to monitor his responses and 
development.  The juvenile court, in contrast, will surely dismiss all 
charges on the ground that, being under the age of seven, he is too 
young to be punished at the hands of the state.  So why it is that the 
boy has an excuse of Aimmaturity@ in law that he does not have at 
home?  Is it because the law believes that children have no sense of 
responsibility at 6 years 11 months and, yet, suddenly acquire it at the 
moment they turn 7?  Is it because lawmakers at work abjure the 
moral bearings they possess at home?  Is it because the law=s excuse of 
immaturity is entirely lacking in normative basis?  Clearly not.  
Legislators recognize that because the juvenile court system is  
impersonal, because its public declarations of delinquency are highly 
stigmatic, because the few sanctions at its disposal are harsh, and 
because it is in institutionally incapable of tailoring juvenile sanctions 
to the gradational senses of responsibility of children under 7, the 
juvenile delinquency systems ought to follow a bright-line rule that 
leaves the disciplining of children under 7 to their parents.  The law=s
excuse of immaturity is not lacking in  normativity; it is consciously 
based upon normative judgments regarding the difference between 
public reproof and inter-personal reproof.73
Berman advocates a Aconceptual@ distinction between 
justification and excuse that, he says, reflects Asociological@ facts but 
in reality is grounded in normative judgments.  A defense is a 
Ajustification,@ he says, if it renders permissible conduct that would 
otherwise be a crime.  A defense is an Aexcuse,@ in turn, if it renders 
non-punishable conduct that is criminal.74 This distinction is 
substantive, Berman says,  not formal.  That is, the distinction does 
 
73 For a description of the various ages at which various jurisdictions regard 
children as possessing criminal responsibility, see Lisa Micucci, Responsibility and 
the Young Person, 11 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 277, 279-86 (1998). 
74 Berman, Justifications and Excuses, pp. 24-25. 
36 Westen 
 
not depend upon whether the legislature uses the terms Apermissible@
or Anon-punishable.@75 Rather, the distinction turns upon the 
normative judgments that legislatures and courts make in enacting 
and interpreting defenses.  A defense renders conduct permissible if, 
and only if, its true legislative purpose is to declare, >This is the norm  
by which we, the legislature, call on people to guide their conduct, the 
norm  that we aspire that people follow=.76 A defense is an excuse if 
for any reason the legislature does not wish to punish actors whose 
conduct falls short of what the legislature has called upon them to do.  
The measure of any internally-consistent distinction between 
justification and excuse is its usefulness, particularly  in relation to 
competing distinctions.  I have two doubts about the usefulness of 
Berman=s distinction.  The first concerns Berman=s definition of 
Ajustifications.@ I doubt that it is possible to determine with any 
confidence whether a legislature=s true motive in enacting an 
exculpatory defense is to declare how the legislature aspires that 
people behave (as opposed to what the legislature regards as 
acceptable conduct under the circumstances), or whether the 
legislature=s true motive is to exonerate actors whose conduct falls 
short of what the legislature aspires that people do.  I could use any 
exculpatory defense to illustrate this problem.  But consider a 
legislature that, having made it a crime ATo intentionally kill another 
human being,@ provides a defense to those who AReasonably believe 
that using lethal force is necessary to protect themselves from being 
unlawfully killed, even if they are mistaken in their belief.@ According 
to Berman, if the legislature=s true motive is to inspire people to follow 
the injunction, AThou shalt not kill,@while simultaneously providing a 
defense for those who kill in self-defense, then the defense is an 
Aexcuse.@ If, on the other hand, the legislature=s true motive is to 
inspire people to ascertain facts as best they can and reluctantly to kill 
rather than be wrongly killed, then the defense is a Ajustification.@
The problem is that if individual legislators were casually polled, they  
would probably confess to having both motives; and, yet, because the 
process of legislating does not call upon them to rank their motives in 
 
75 Berman, Justifications and Excuses, p. 37-38. 
76 Berman, Justifications and Excuses, pp. 31-33, 50, 53-56, 73-74. 
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those terms, there is no way to determine after the fact which motives 
predominated. 
The second problem with Berman=s distinction concerns his 
definition of Aexcuses.@ Berman defines Aexcuses@ in such as way as to 
preclude them from possessing anything normatively in common 
other than that they lead to acquittals.  He defines them as consisting 
of all defenses that are not Ajustifications@ -- including both 
exculpatory defenses like insanity and non-exculpatory defenses like 
diplomatic immunity.  Now we have seen that non-exculpatory 
defenses share nothing normatively in common with one another, 
apart from all being  defenses.  By aggregating them with exculpatory 
defenses, Berman makes it difficult to inquire into the very thing I 
shall be investigating in part IV -- namely, whether what I call 
Aexcuses@ (i.e., exculpatory defenses that are not defenses of actus reus 
or justification) are derivative of a broader norm of exculpation. 
 
III.  RIVAL DEFINITIONS AND NORMATIVE ACCOUNTS OF 
AEXCUSE@
Numerous commentators have sought to identify what John 
Gardner calls Athe gist of excuses.@77 In order to account for excuses, 
commentators must first do something like what I have undertaken in 
part I: they must explicitly or implicitly identify the set of defenses for 
which they hope to provide accounts.  Interestingly, commentators 
differ widely  on the kinds of defenses that qualify as Aexcuses.@ Thus, 
Gardner defines excuses in such a way as to exclude defenses of 
insanity, immaturity, and involuntariness, which he regards instead as 
defenses of Alack of responsibility.@78 Others define excuses to include 
such defenses without being limited to them.79 And still others come 
close to defining excuses to consist exclusively of the very defenses that 
Gardner excludes.80
77 John Gardner, The Gist of Excuses, 1 BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW 575 
(1998). 
78 Gardner, The Gist of Excuses, pp. 587-88.   
79 See, e.g., George Fletcher, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 798-807. 
80 See, e.g., Paul Robinson, THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF CRIMINAL 
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My purpose in this part is to describe and criticize the leading 
accounts of excuse.  I shall be criticizing them from both internal and 
external standpoints.  By internal criticism I mean criticism that 
accepts a commentator=s definition of Aexcuse@ but critically examines 
how persuasively the commentator accounts for the normative 
content of criminal defenses that thereby fall within the definition.  
By external criticism I mean criticism that accepts a commentator=s
normative account of the content of what the commentator defines as 
Aexcuses@ but critically examines  whether the definition of  excuses is 
under-inclusive or over-inclusive.   To illustrate what I mean by such 
external criticism, consider the defense of duress.  Commentators 
commonly classify duress as an excuse, in contradistinction to  
necessity and self-defense which they classify as justifications.  Yet we 
have seen that duress, necessity, and self-defense all share the same 
essential features:  they are all choice-of-evil defenses that are valid if, 
and only if, the evils chosen  are normatively proportional to the evils 
avoided.  To be sure, commentators argue that duress is distinctive 
because victims of duress sometimes make  panicked choices that they 
would not make if they were cool and collected.  But of course the 
same thing can happen to victims of necessity and self-defense, and 
when it does, the latter are judged by the standards of persons in their 
stressful Asituations@ without altering the way necessity and self-
defense are classified.  Some commentators also claim that the 
defense of duress is distinctive in that it allows actors to do the wrong 
thing when the average person, when confronted with the same hard 
choice, would also do the wrong.81 However, we have seen that that 
is not so.  Actors under duress are judged by the standards of persons 
of Areasonable@ resolution, Areasonableness@ being a normative 
measure of the steadfastness and respect of for others that the law can 
rightly expect of people, not an empirical measure of the way people 
 
LAW 81-83. 
81 See, e.g., Kadish, Excusing Crime, at 265, 274 (arguing that an actor is 
excused for making a wrong choice under duress and that he is excused because, 
"though he breached a legal norm, he acted in circumstances so constraining 
that most people would have done the same," and, hence, "the person has not 
shown himself to be more blameable than the rest of us"). 
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typically behave.  As a consequence, any theory of excuse that 
classifies duress as an excuse is subject to external criticism on the  
ground that it is either over-inclusive in  including duress as an excuse 
or under-inclusive in excluding necessity and self-defense as  excuses. 
 
A.  The Character Theory of Excuses.
The character theory of excuses is a function of a broader, 
character theory of blameworthiness often attributed to David 
Hume.82 According  to Hume, a person who performs a wrongful act 
is blameworthy if, and only if,  his conduct manifests bad character on 
his part -- that is, if, and only if, his conduct reveals him to possess a 
settled disposition to disregard the legitimate interests of others.83 It 
follows, therefore, that a person who performs a wrongful act has an 
excuse if, inter alia, (1) he made reasonable and good faith mistake 
consistent with his being of good character, (2) he was compelled by 
pressures over which he had no control (other that the pressures of 
settled character), (3) he was too young to have developed a settled 
character, (4) he acted from insanity rather than any settled character 
on his part, or (5) his conduct was out of character for him.84
The character theory of excuses has a great many strengths, in 
addition to its Humean pedigree.  The theory is revealing of 
culpability, because Hume=s account of when actors ought to be 
excused from blame (i.e., when their wrongful conduct does not 
 
82 See Michael Bayles, Character, Purpose, and Criminal Responsibility, 5 LAW 
AND PHILOSOPHY 5 (1982). 
83 David Hume, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 100-
02 (Henry Regnery ed., 1965). 
84 For exponents of character theory, see Peter Arenella, Character, Choice 
and Moral Agency, in E. F. Paul, Fred  D. Miller Jr. & J. Paul, eds., CRIME,
CULPABILITY AND REMEDY 59, at 67-68 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990); Richard 
Brandt, A Motivational Theory of Excuses, in J. PENNOCK AND J. CHAPMAN, EDS., 
NOMOS: CRIMINAL JUSTICE 165 (New York: New York University, 1985); 
George Fletcher, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 799-802; Nicola Lacey, STATE 
PUNISHMENT: POLITICAL PRINCIPLES AND COMMUNITY VALUES   67-78 (1988); 
Victor Tadros, The Characters of Excuse, 21 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 495 (2001); 
and George Vuoso, Background, Responsibility, and Excuse, 96 YALE L.J. 1661 
(1987).. For powerful criticism of character theory, see Antony Duff, Choice, 
Character, and Criminal Liability, 12 LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 345, 361-70 (1993). 
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manifest bad character on their part) is a direct function of Hume=s
account of when actors are deserving of blame (i.e., when their 
wrongful conduct is a manifestation of bad character on their part).  
The theory also fares well under external critique because its 
definition of Aexcuses@ comes into play only with respect to  actors 
who have engaged in conduct that the state regards as regrettable or 
undesirable, and with respect to them, the definition of excuses is co-
extensive with the entirety of their exculpatory defenses. 
The character theory of excuses nevertheless presents  at least 
two internal problems.  First, the theory accepts as an excuse what  
the criminal law universally rejects as a defense, namely, the claim by 
a wrongdoer that his conduct was Aout of character@ for him.  The 
character theory accepts such claims as an excuse because conduct 
that is out of character for an actor manifests no character of his at 
all, much less bad character, and, hence, provides no  basis for blame. 
 In contrast, the criminal law rejects such claims, at least when  
proffered as complete defenses to wrongdoing.  Suppose, for example, 
that a man with a sterling and seemingly deserved reputation for 
honesty acts on impulse and steals petty cash from his employer.  The 
fact that the theft is an exceptional lapse from otherwise good 
character may constitute a partial defense for the man by virtue of 
mitigating his punishment.  Thus, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
permit judges in certain cases to reduce the sentences of defendants 
whose  impulsive conduct Arepresents a marked deviation . . . from an 
otherwise law-abiding life.@85 But the fact that wrongful conduct is an 
exceptional lapse of otherwise good character provides no basis in law 
for exculpating an actor altogether. 
Now one might try to resolve the foregoing problem by linking 
 character to conduct.  The argument would go as follows:  AIt is a 
fallacy to conceive of >character= as existing independently of conduct. 
 A person=s character is constituted by the attitude toward others that 
he exhibits in the totality of his conduct toward them, including 
conduct that departs from what his past behavior leads observers to 
predict.  Thus, an employee who acts on impulse to steal only once 
 
85 18 U.S.C.S.  Appendix ' 5K2.20  (2004)(Aberrant Behavior). 
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exhibits less bad character than an employee who plans his theft in 
advance or who steals many times.  But the former employee=s
wrongful conduct nevertheless exhibits bad character on his part 
because it  reveals him to be a person who, when the impulse arises, is 
willing to steal once from his employer.  And because his wrongful 
conduct exhibits bad character on his part, he deserves to be blamed 
for it, albeit perhaps less than wrongdoers who reveal themselves to be 
inveterate thieves.@86
This redefinition of Acharacter@ may resolve the first problem  
in the character theory of excuses, but it does not address the second 
problem.  The second problem is that the theory rejects as an excuse 
what the criminal law typically accepts as a defense -- namely, a claim 
by a mentally-ill actor with chronic paranoia that because of his 
chronic mental illness, he did not know what he was doing when he 
killed an innocent victim in the mistaken belief that the latter was 
trying to kill him.  Now I have said that the character theory excuses 
actors whose wrongful conduct is a product of intermittent mental 
illness rather than character.  But it does not excuse a mentally ill 
actor whose wrongful conduct is a product of chronic paranoia that 
has become his character, because his conduct is then as much a 
manifestation of his character as anyone=s.  Nor, under the revised 
theory stated above, does the character theory excuse an actor whose 
wrongdoing is the product of aberrant bouts of mental illness that are 
out of character for him, given that Acharacter@ under the revised 
view is constituted as much by aberrant acts as by predictable acts.  
To be sure, one could try to supplement character theory by 
adding that a person ought not to be blamed for manifestations of 
character over which he has no control. But that raises problems of its 
own.  For one thing, it would not satisfy Hume and other like-minded 
 Acompatibilists;@ for Hume was a determinist who believed that no 
one has control over the character he possesses, and, hence, lack of 
control over character cannot itself be exculpating.87 More serious 
 
86 Cf. Antony Duff, Choice, Character, and Criminal Liability, 12 LAW AND 
PHILOSOPHY 345, 371-80 (1993).  For criticism of this move to vindicate 
character theory, see Moore, Choice, Character, and Excuse, pp. 581-85. 
87 See David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding 95, 104 
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still, if lack of Acontrol@ excuses a person for conduct that stems from 
character, it must be because lack of control excuses generally,
regardless of character.  In that event, however, lack of control 
operates not as a supplement to a character theory of excuses but as 
an independent rival to a character theory of excuses. 
 
B.  The Choice Theory of Excuses.
H.L.A. Hart published a series of celebrated essays between 
1957 and 1967, expounding what has since become known as the 
Achoice@ theory of criminal excuses.88 Like others who seek to 
account for criminal excuses, Hart begins by identifying which legal 
defenses he means to include within excuse.  Excuse,@ Hart says, 
comes into play  after actors otherwise commit criminal wrongs, and it 
exculpates actors on the basis of certain Amental conditions,@
including, he says, accidents, mistakes of law and fact, insanity, 
immaturity, involuntariness, and duress.89 Interestingly, however, in 
the course Hart=s 10-year effort to account for such excuses, he frames 
 it in two slightly but significantly different ways.   Sometimes Hart 
argues that actors are, and ought to be, excused from criminal 
conduct that they do not Achoose.@90 At other times, Hart argues that 
actors are, and ought to be, excused from criminal conduct that they 
lack Acapacity and a fair opportunity to choose@ to avoid.91 These two 
formulations of the theory have influenced commentators, some of 
whom embrace Achoice@ as the rationale of excuses,92 and others of 
whom embrace Acapacity and fair opportunity to choose.@93 I shall 
 
(L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955)(originally 1743). 
88 See H.L.A. Hart, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW vii-viii, 21-24, 28-53, 181-83, 227-30  (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1968). 
89 See H.L.A. Hart, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 28, 229. 
90 H.L.A. Hart, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 44-45, 49. 
91 H.L.A. Hart, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 23. 
92 See Moore, Choice, Character, and Excuse, pp. 574-88; Kadish, Excusing 
Crime, p. 259. 
93 See Joshua Dressler, Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New 
Excuses, and the Model Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 671, 701-02(1988); Hyman 
Gross, A THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 137 (New York: Oxford University 
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address these two formulations of choice theory and criticize each of 
them on internal grounds.94 I shall also criticize on external grounds 
commentators who accept the choice theory of excuses but exclude as 
Aexcuses@ certain defenses that Hart includes, namely, defenses of 
mistake of fact and law regarding the elements of offenses.  
 
1.  Absence of Choice 
In his 1957 ALegal Responsibility and Excuses,@ Hart derives 
excuse from what he asserts to be the nature of the criminal law itself. 
 Criminal law, he says, is a Achoosing system.@ It specifies the harms 
and risks it wishes people to avoid, and it gives people Areasons@ to 
avoid them by girding them with Acosts.@ But criminal law ultimately 
leaves it to people Ato choose@95 what to do.    Accordingly, he says, an 
actor is, and ought to be, excused from criminal conduct that he does 
not Areal[ly]@ choose.96
This version of the choice theory successfully explains some 
defenses.   Thus, it explains why it is a defense that an actor=s conduct 
was a product of epilepsy.  It explains why, when a person is charged 
with a crime of purpose or knowledge, it is a defense that his conduct 
was the product of accident, mistake of fact, or mistake of law.  And it 
explains why it is a defense that a mentally-ill or involuntarily 
intoxicated actor did not know what he was doing or, if he did, that 
he did not know it was wrong.  However, this version of the choice 
theory does not account for the law=s treatment of other defenses.  
The theory fails to explain why the law excuses  certain actors who do 
choose and refuses to excuse certain actors who do not choose.  
To illustrate the law=s refusal to excuse actors from criminal 
conduct that they do not choose, consider crimes of negligence.  
Suppose, for example, that an actor is charged with involuntary 
manslaughter based on evidence that he negligently killed another 
 
Press, 1979); Jeremy Horder, Criminal Culpability: The Possibility of a General 
Theory, 12 LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 193, 199 (1993). 
94 For powerful criticism of choice theory, see Antony Duff, Choice, 
Character, and Criminal Liability, pp. 350-61. 
95 H.L.A. Hart, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 44. 
96 H.L.A. Hart, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 45. 
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person, say, by accidentally dropping a cocked pistol or mistakenly 
believing a rifle is unloaded.   An actor who accidentally or mistakenly 
kills does not choose to kill.  Indeed, if he chose to kill, he would be 
guilty of either murder or involuntary manslaughter.  Yet the law does 
not regard his failure to choose to kill as a defense to involuntary 
manslaughter.  Involuntary manslaughter is precisely the offense a 
person commits by killing not through choice, but through 
negligence.  The law also regularly inculpates actors whose voluntary 
intoxication causes them to unwittingly undertake risks of which they 
would be aware if they were sober.97
Now consider the converse, viz., the law=s willingness to 
excuse actors from criminal conduct that they do choose.   An 
example is a mentally-ill actor who knows what he is doing, and 
knows that it is wrong, but claims to suffer from a Acompulsion@ to do 
it.  Even if one assumes that compulsions of that kind prevent actors 
from choosing other than they do, it does not follow that the 
compulsion prevent actors from choosing what they do.  On the 
contrary, the claim with respect to such compulsions is precisely that 
they leave actors with no alternative but to choose to do what they 
do.98
2. Absence of Capacity and Fair Opportunity to Choose Otherwise 
Hart shifts emphasis in his later essays.  Rather than arguing 
that an actor has a defense to criminal conduct, x, if he fails to choose 
x, Hart argues that an actor has a defense to x if he fails to possess a 
Acapacity and fair opportunity to choose@ non-x. 99The latter version of 
the choice theory has several advantages over the former version.  
Thus, the latter version explains why the law punishes negligence and 
acts of persons who are voluntarily intoxicated.  Negligent actors and 
voluntarily intoxicated actors may not choose to engage in the 
 
97 For a choice theorist who recognizes that choice theory is inconsistent with 
the law of criminal negligence, see Moore, Choice, Character, and Excuse, pp. 
588-90. 
98 See Kadish.  Cf. Dan-Cohen to the effect that a person can choose to do 
what he has no choice but to do. 
99 H.L.A. Hart, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 23. 
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wrongful conduct with which they are charged, but they do possess 
the Acapacity and fair opportunity@ to choose to avoid such conduct 
by attending more closely to what they are doing and by refraining 
from intoxicating themselves.  The capacity version of choice theory 
also appears to explain why mentally-ill actors are excused from 
knowingly committing wrongful acts that they are allegedly compelled 
to commit.   Such mentally-ill persons may knowingly choose to do 
what they do, the argument goes, but given their compulsions, they 
do not have capacity to choose otherwise.
The problem with the capacity version of choice theory is 
that, although it appears to explain insanity cases based upon 
compulsions, it does so by means of a question-begging metaphor.  
The capacity theory is persuasive with respect to persons who lack an 
opportunity to exercise their wills (e.g., persons suffering from epilepsy 
or reflex actions or persons who are violently pushed) and people who 
are subjected to overwhelming physically force against their will (e.g., 
persons who are carried kicking and screaming into the street and 
then charged with being in a public place),  because lack of Acapacity@
literally describes them: lacking an opportunity to affect their conduct 
through an exercise their wills, they have no Acapacity@ to prevent 
wrongful harms or risks that may occur and, hence, absent strict 
liability, should not be blamed for them.   The same is not true, 
however, of actors who in their insanity, hypnosis or sleepwalking, 
engage in complex actions that require what philosophers call 
Aintentionality@ ( i.e., propositional beliefs about the world), and 
choices of means toward ends (e.g.,  walking down stairs to get to a 
woodpile, picking up an axe to use it, wielding the axe for its 
purpose).100 Of course, one can say of such persons that they have no 
Acapacity@ or no Asubstantial capacity@ to choose otherwise than they 
choose.  But with respect to conduct that presupposes intentionality 
and choices of means and ends, the terms  Ano capacity@ and Ano 
control@ are not literal descriptions of events that can actually be 
observed or experienced.  They are metaphors invoked to give persons 
 
100 See Michael Moore, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE 
RELATIONSHIP 257 (1984); Morse, Acts, Choices, and Coercion, pp. 1642-45. 
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who choose to inflict harms or risks in states of insanity, hypnosis, or 
sleepwalking the benefit of the same kind of exculpation enjoyed by  
persons who lack an opportunity to make any choices at all.101 They 
are metaphors because neither science nor forensics knows of any way 
to determine that an actor who intentionally chooses to do something 
could not have chosen otherwise.102
To be sure, the fact that a theory speaks in metaphors does 
not prevent it from having explanatory force, provided that its use of 
metaphor is perspicuous -- that is, provided that the features that 
trigger the metaphor are evident and normatively compelling.  The 
principal internal problem with the capacity theory of excuses is a lack 
of  perspicuousness.  The features that are supposed to trigger the 
metaphors of Ano capacity@ may be evident with respect to some 
varieties of disordered agency (e.g., hypnosis and somnambulism), but 
they are highly occluded in others.   And because they are occluded, 
they deprive the theory of explanatory power.   The theory purports to 
explain when actors are, and are not, excused from blame.  But 
because the theory refers to the conditions of blamelessness only 
obliquely rather than directly, it obfuscates what it purports to 
clarify.103
A good example are the legal defenses that most closely 
appropriate the language of capacity theory, namely, so-called 
Avolitional@ tests of insanity.    Nearly all Anglo-American 
 
101 For a powerful statement of this thesis, see Stephen Morse, Acts, Choices, 
and Coercion: Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1591-92 (1994).  
See also Sanford Kadish, Excusing Crime, 266 (conceding that invoking lack of 
Achoice@ in such cases is Ametaphorical@).  See also id. at 282. 
102 See Morse, Acts, Choices, and Coercion, pp. 1600-01 (A[I]t is famously 
the case that . . . it is impossible to differentiate >irresistible= impulses from those 
simply not resisted@); Kadish, Excusing Crime, p. 281 (Athere is no way objectively to 
establish that a person could not refrain from a criminal action, rather than would 
not@). 
 
103 Cf. Morse, Acts, Choices, and Coercion, p. 1610 (arguing that Anotions of 
loss of control are almost always parasitic upon other justifications for excuse and 
that the notion of loss of control unduly threatens to mislead or confuse 
legislators, criminal justice system participants, and the public@). 
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jurisdictions possess criminal defenses of insanity that are defined in 
Acognitive@ terms;  that is, they are defenses like the rule in 
M=Naghten that consist of the claim that by virtue of mental illness, 
the defendant did not know what he was doing or, if he did, he did 
not know it was wrong.   In addition, however, many jurisdictions 
superimpose defenses of insanity that are defined in Avolitional@ terms. 
 Volitional defenses of insanity consist of the claim, >The defendant 
may have known what he was doing, but being mentally ill, he lacked 
capacity to control himself=. The Airresistible impulse@ defense of 
insanity is a volitional defense of criminal insanity.104 So, too, is the 
second part of Model Penal Code section 4.01, which provides a 
defense to a mentally-ill actor who, though he may have known what 
he was doing and may have known that it was wrong, nevertheless 
lacked Asubstantial capacity to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of the law.@ Volitional tests of insanity are designed to 
exculpate mentally-ill persons who do not obviously qualify for 
cognitional defenses of insanity like M=Naghten and, yet, suffer from  
compulsive and disordered thinking that tends to evoke pity rather 
than indignation and reproach.  Mark Bechard was such a person.105
104 See e.g., Bethea v. United States, 365 A.2d 64, 72 (D.C. Ct. of App. 
1976); Washington v. Crenshaw, 98 Wn.2d 789, 798, 659 P.2d 488, 494 (1983). 
105 See Bangor Daily News,  October 17, 1996; Bangor Daily News, October 
10, 1996; Portland Press Herald, October 8, 1996; Portland Press Herald 
(Maine), October 17, 1996, page 1A; Portland Press Herald (Maine), 
October 12, 1996, page 1A; Portland Press Herald (Maine), October 11, 1996, 
page 1A. 
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Mark Bechard and the Sisters 
Bechard was 38 on January, 1996, when he attacked a 
group of elderly nuns from the Sisters of the Blessed 
Sacrament Convent in Waterville, Maine, who had 
recently become a source of solace and comfort for 
him.  By then he had already had a twenty-year 
history of hallucinations, mood swings, and delusions 
of persecution regarding political figures, entertainers 
and strangers.   Beginning when he was 10 years old, 
he was plagued with severe headaches and began 
having difficulty sleeping.  By the time he was a high 
school junior, he felt he was being persecuted by his 
friends.  After a single semester at college, he returned 
home, saying that he began getting Adark moods@ and 
not sleeping for days at a time.  He told his mother 
that voices in his head were always there, always 
talking to him, and he felt an obligation to follow their 
directions.  The next year he was hospitalized a dozen 
times.  Over the following 20 years, he was an 
outpatient at a half-dozen mental institutions.  He was 
placed on medication which seemed to work for 
several years; but by January, his mother said, "The 
voices were getting louder and he was losing control." 
He had always been religious, and he walked barefoot 
one year from Waterville to Bangor, Maine, to bring 
the priest a message of "repentance" that he said God 
was telling him in his head.  He had hoped to become 
a priest, but was beginning to despair that he would 
not stay healthy enough to fulfill his felt vocation.  In 
the six months before the event, he spent increasing 
time at the Convent, where he enjoyed praying with 
the nuns.   
Bechard awoke on January 27 in a particularly dark 
mood, aggravated, perhaps, by his having stopped his 
medication.  "His face was black," his mother later 
said, Ahe didn't have any eyes at all -- they were just all 
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black.  Things were coming out his mouth but it was 
not any language.  It wasn't French; it wasn't English." 
 He took his trumpet and trombone B possessions, his 
mother said, that Agave him his identity@ B and threw 
them in the trash and left the house in a cold and 
driving rain storm, dressed in nothing but pants and a 
T-shirt.  His mother called the emergency mental-
health hotline, but the telephone lines were down 
because of the storm and no one answered.  
Meanwhile, Bechard walked to the convent where he 
sat in a pew, drenched and sobbing, his head jerking 
back and forth, and breathing heavily.  During the 
Prayer of the Faithful, when the usual response of the 
congregation is "Lord, hear our prayer," Bechard 
would say: "May God thwart the path of the evil one." 
 The nuns, though aware of his mental illness, were 
accustomed to his being well-dressed and clean-
shaven.  Alarmed by his appearance and bizarre 
behavior, they worried that he might be high on 
drugs.  When he asked to speak to a priest, the nuns 
pretended to direct him to the rectory but instead 
directed him to the outside and locked the door.  
Upon being shut out, he first began sobbing, jerking 
his head, and taking in loud gulps of air.  Then he 
proceeded to the kitchen door, broke the glass of the 
door,  unlocked it from inside, and entered on a 
rampage.  He killed his first victim, 67 year-old Sister 
Marie Fortin, by knocking her to the ground and 
repeatedly stomped on her face.  He killed his next 
victim, 68 year-old Sister Edna Cardozo, by beating 
her about the face and stabbing with a kitchen knife 
that he left protruding from her cheek.   He found his 
next victim, 69 year-old Sister Patricia Keane in the 
chapel, where she was praying.  He grabbed Sister 
Keane=s metal walking cane and struck her three times 
on the head until it broke, whereupon he seized a 
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statue of the Blessed Virgin and despite her 
exclamations of ANo, don=t do that,@ he hit her with it. 
 He was poised to hit her again with it when a 
policeman entered and ordered him to Afreeze.@ He 
immediately put the statue down and lay down on the 
floor.  
Bechard=s bizarre behavior continued at the police 
station.   His mood changed rapidly and repeatedly 
from being repentant to having hallucinations.  He 
would go from being very calm one minute to, as one 
officer described it, Atrying to dig his eye out with his 
toes.@ He slammed his face into the floor.  He talked 
to himself.  He shouted at people who were not there. 
 He seemed to be Ayell[ing] at himself from inside 
himself,@ one officer said, shouting, "Go, Mark, go.@
"Why, Mark?  Why?" "Now look what you did.  Don't 
do it!  Don't do it!"   Bechard later told psychologists 
that mysterious voices told him to go to the convent 
and get "cat smut" in order to save the "Pixie." 
Characters he called "the abusifier" and the "votese" 
told him to execute the nuns, he said.  But when he 
was asked why he killed the nuns, Bechard replied: "I 
don't know why. I loved them." 
 
Bechard is not one whom the cognitive test of M=Naghten is a 
felicitous fit.106 After all, Bechard must have known that he was 
striking defenseless nuns because he proceeded methodically from one 
defenseless nun to another, despite their pleas for mercy.  And he  
must have known that striking them was wrong because he  claimed 
 
106 This is not to say that Bechard could never be acquitted under a 
traditional M=Naghten rule of insanity.  Obviously, a judge in a jurisdiction bound 
by M=Naghten could instruct a jury on insanity in a case like Bechard=s on the 
ground that the jury might reasonably find that Bechard did not really know what 
he doing.   Rather, the point is that within a jurisdiction that views claims of 
insanity with skepticism and, following the Hinckley verdict, construes 
M=Naghten narrowly, it is a hurdle to say of Bechard that he did not know that he 
was killing and did not know that killing was wrong. 
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to be acting not on behalf of God or an oracle of goodness but on 
behalf of the Aabusifier.@ Moreover, the trial judge did not acquit 
Bechard on the ground that Bechard did not know he was acting 
wrongly.  The trial judge acquitted Bechard in the language of the 
capacity theory of excuses.  He acquitted Bechard on the ground that, 
 by virtue of his mental illness, Bechard Alacked even the most basic 
control to stop himself.@107
Many observers, I suspect, will agree with the judge that 
because of Bechard=s particular kind of disordered thinking, Bechard 
was more to be pitied than condemned.  And because they agree with 
the result the judge reached, they may look favorably on the language 
of Acontrol@ in which the judge framed his decision.  But it is 
important to recognize that when the judge concluded that Bechard 
could not Acontrol . . . himself,@ the judge was not describing 
phenomena that can be scientifically observed.  For there are no 
scientific criteria to ascertain when a person who chooses to do one 
thing could not have chosen otherwise -- no way to know that  
Bechard could not have stopped when the nuns begged for mercy, just 
as he immediately stopped when the policeman ordered him to 
Afreeze.@ Rather, when the judge concluded that Bechard Alacked 
control to stop,@ he used Alack [of] control@ not as description but as a 
conclusory label for certain features of Bechard=s disordered thinking 
that evoked pity in observers rather than indignation.      To be 
sure, if triers of fact intuitively grasp the features of disordered 
thinking that the metaphor of Ano control@ is designed to capture, 
volitional tests of insanity will  function as they are supposed to.  The 
problem with volitional tests of insanity is that triers of fact do not 
always understand what they are supposed to do, and when they do 
not, volitional tests leave them without guidance.  That was precisely 
the problem that beset the jury in trying John Hinckley.  Like 
Bechard, Hinckley was mentally ill; and like Bechard, Hinckley knew 
he was attacking persons who were no threat to his life, and Hinckley 
knew what he was wrong was wrong.  But  in contrast to Bechard=s
compulsive and disordered thinking, Hinckley=s kind of thinking 
 
107 Bangor Daily News, October 17, 1996. 
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aroused indignation in most observers rather than pity.  
Unfortunately, the jurors who were impaneled to try Hinckley did not 
intuitively grasp the features of compulsive and disordered thinking 
that the metaphor of Ano control@ is presumably designed to capture.  
And because the volitional test of insanity provided them  with no 
explicit guidance, they ended up making a judgment of Ano control@
that so outraged the public that numerous legislatures, including 
Congress, repealed the volitional test altogether.108
This is not to equate Hinckley=s mania with Bechard=s
disordered thinking for purposes of excuse.  The normative differences 
between the two men=s species of insanity are significant, and a 
perspicuous theory of excuse would identify them.109 The point is that 
volitional tests of insanity do not identify those differences.  They 
provide jurors with no guidance as to the normative judgments they 
are supposed to be making and, by providing jurors with no such 
guidance, relegate the resolution of insanity cases to a hope and 
prayer. 
 
3.  Paul Robinson=s Realm of Excuses 
Paul Robinson accepts Hart=s choice theory of excuses, but he 
excludes from his definition of Aexcuses@ certain defenses that Hart 
includes -- namely, defenses of mistake of fact and law that arise with 
respect to the elements of offenses.110 In doing so, Robinson opens 
himself to criticism on external grounds, that is, on the ground that 
 
108 For an account of the political and legal reaction to the Hinckley verdict, 
including skepticism among lawmakers about what it means to say that Hinckley 
could not control himself, see Richard Bonnie, Anne Coughlin, John Jeffries, and 
Peter Low, CRIMINAL LAW 540-41(New York: Foundation Press, 2004). 
109 As we shall see in Part IV, the significant difference between Hinckley 
and Bechard is that Hinckley can be reproached for selfish disregard for the 
legitimate interests of others, because he acted for many months to bring about a 
consistent, perversely rational and well-defined goal at their expense of others, 
i.e., the goal of doing the most heinous thing he could imagine in order to 
demonstrate to Jodie Foster the depth of his commitment and to indelibly link 
his identity to hers in the world=s eyes, and because he achieved his goal.  In 
contrast, Bechard cannot be reproached for selfishness because  neither Bechard 
nor anyone else can make sense of what he hoped to achieve. 
110 See note ____, supra. 
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he excludes from his definition of  excuses certain defenses that are 
normatively identical to defenses  that he includes as excuses.   
An obvious example is the similarity between reasonable 
mistakes of fact with respect to defenses of justification (which 
Robinson includes within Aexcuse@) and reasonable mistakes of fact 
with respect to elements of offenses (which Robinson excludes from A
excuse@).  Consider two actors -- AJohn@ and AJoan.@ John, seeing a 
third person, V, running toward him, kills  V  in the reasonable but 
mistaken belief that killing V is necessary to prevent V from 
wrongfully killing him.   In contrast, Joan, using a theater pistol upon 
a theatrical stage, kills another person, V, in the reasonable but 
mistaken belief that the pistol is loaded with blanks.  John and Joan 
both inflict a harm that the state regrets and that the criminal law of 
homicide seeks to prevent.  Both act on the basis of states of mind for 
which they cannot be faulted.  Yet Robinson would say that John=s is 
a defense of excuse, while Joan=s is a defense of lack of mens rea. By 
placing the two defenses in separate categories, Robinson obscures the 
fact that John=s excuse and Joan=s defense of lack of mens rea share the 
same exculpatory principle in common -- namely, that a person who 
inflicts a harm that the state regrets ought nevertheless to be 
exculpated if his attitude was one of proper regard for the interests of 
others. 
Another but less obvious example is the similarity between the 
M=Naghten defense of insanity (which Robinson treats as Aexcuse@)
and reasonable mistakes of fact and law with respect to elements of 
offenses (which Robinson excludes from excuses).   M=Naghten 
provides a defense to wrongdoers who, because of mental illness, do 
not know what they are in fact doing or, alternatively, do, indeed,  
know what they are in fact doing but do not know it is wrong.  
M=Naghten constitutes as an Aexcuse@ under Robinson=s capacity 
theory because by virtue of their mental illnesses, actors have no 
capacity to know that they are doing something wrong.111 Yet 
Robinson=s capacity theory excludes from the class of Aexcuses@
certain defenses that, like M=Naghten, also consist of the claim, AI
111 Paul Robinson, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF CRIMINAL LAW 86. 
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didn=t know,@ namely, defenses of mistake of fact and mistake of law 
that arise with respect to the elements of offenses.  
Admittedly, M=Naghten contains an additional claim besides AI
didn=t know.@ It contains the claim, ABut I couldn=t help not knowing.@
Nevertheless, it is important to understand the limited role that AI
couldn=t help it@ plays in M=Naghten. After all, it does not suffice 
under M=Naghten to show that a person couldn=t help but not know, 
because if it did, M=Naghten would be a defense  for persons who are 
ignorant because of voluntarily intoxication as well as those who are 
ignorant because of insanity.  Nor does it suffice under M=Naghten to 
show that a person could not help but know the facts of which he was 
aware (as opposed to not knowing) because if it did, M=Naghten would 
be a defense for persons who, perhaps because of some kind of 
uncontrollable autism, are more aware of the wrongful risks they are 
undertaking than other persons  would be.  Rather, M=Naghten is a 
defense if, and only if, actors are unaware of facts or law for reasons 
that were not their fault. Significantly, however, the very same 
defense exists in sane persons and for precisely the same reasons.  A 
sane person who makes a reasonable mistake of fact or law with 
respect to an offense or a justification that is not based upon strict 
liability has the same defense as a mentally-ill person under 
M=Naghten.112 They both have defenses if, and only if, they can claim, 
AI didn=t know I was doing anything wrong, and my ignorance was not 
my fault.@ The M=Naghten requirement that an actor=s ignorance be 
attributable to mental illness performs the same function as the 
ordinary requirement that a sane actor=s ignorance be reasonable, 
namely, the function of demonstrating that the actor=s ignorance 
cannot be attributed to fault on his part.  In both cases, however, 
what exculpates is that, for reasons that were not their fault, the sane 
and insane actors did not know that they were doing anything wrong. 
To appreciate the similarity between M=Naghten and ordinary 
defenses of mistake of fact or law, suppose that a jurisdiction has not 
yet had occasion to either adopt or reject M=Naghten. Suppose further 
 
112 Cf. Brandt, A Motivational Theory of Excuses, p. 185-86 (recognizing this  
with respect to insane mistakes of fact but denying it with respect to insane 
mistakes of law). 
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that the jurisdiction possesses a statute that makes it an offense to 
Anegligently kill another human being.@ Suppose finally that two 
homicides occur: one by a thespian, AOlivier,@ who reasonably, but 
mistakenly, believes that a pistol he is handed to use on the stage is 
loaded with blanks; and a mentally-ill person, ALenny,@ who strangles 
a woman in the mistaken belief that he is squeezing a lemon.  Olivier 
will presumably be acquitted on the ground that by virtue of his 
reasonable mistake of fact, he was not negligent.  What about Lenny? 
 Obviously, Lenny=s mistake of fact would have been outlandish in a 
non-psychotic person.  But what about a person like Lenny who 
cannot help but see lemons where others see human necks?    Can 
Lenny=s mistake be said to have been reasonable for an insane person 
like him? If so, then Lenny will be acquitted on the same ground as 
Olivier, even though the jurisdiction has not yet adopted M=Naghten.
This means that if the jurisdiction now adopts M=Naghten, it will 
merely be replicating a defense that would have existed without it.  
Nevertheless, if the jurisdiction now adopts  M=Naghten, it will be 
adopting what Robinson calls an Aexcuse@ in contradistinction to the  
identical defense that would have existed without it that Robinson 
would deny is an Aexcuse.@
C.  Recent Theories of Excuse 
John Gardner and Claire Finkelstein have each recently 
advanced original theories of excuse.  
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1.  John Gardner=s ARole-Based@ Theory of Excuse 
John Gardner has written two essays with the past decade, one 
of which defines Aexcuses,@ and the other of which explores the 
normative Agist@ of excuses so defined.113 AExcuses,@ as Gardner 
defines them, come into play only with respect to persons who possess 
the following features:  (1) they are Aresponsible,@ that is, they possess 
the capacity to Areason intelligibly through to action;@114 (2) they 
violate the elements of criminal offenses, including actus reus and 
mens rea elements alike;115 and (3) they do so under circumstances 
that Gardner classifies as Aunjustified,@ viz., where the offenses are the 
wrong thing to do, all things considered, or, alternatively, where the 
offenses are acceptable things to do, all things considered, but where 
the actors fail to act for those acceptable reasons.116 Gardner thus 
excludes as excuses several defenses that Hart and others include.   
Gardner excludes insanity, immaturity, sleepwalking, and hypnosis, all 
on the ground that their victims are incapable of reasoning intelligibly 
and, hence, in Gardner=s taxonomy, lack something that is even more 
fundamental than excuse, namely, Aresponsibility.@117 And, like 
Robinson, Gardner excludes accident, mistake of fact, and mistake of 
law regarding the elements of offenses, all on the ground that their 
victims lack mens rea and, hence, are not guilty of anything that he 
believes would call for excuse.118 The exculpatory defenses that 
remain are Aexcuses,@ Gardner says; and those that are full defenses 
consist of these:  duress, accident, mistake of fact, and mistake of law 
regarding defenses of justification.  
Having defined excuses, Gardner provides what he calls an 
AAristotelian account@ of them.  A responsible actor who commits an 
unjustified offense ought nonetheless to be excused, Gardner says, if  
 
113 John Gardner, Justifications and Reasons, in HARM AND CULPABILITY 103-
129 (Oxford:  Clarendon Press, 1996); John Gardner, The Gist of Excuses, 1
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 575 (1998). 
114 Gardner, The Gist of Excuses, at 589.  See also Gardner, Justifications and 
Reasons, at 121-22 & n. 35. 
115 See Gardner, Justifications and Reasons, at 120-21. 
116 See Gardner, Justifications and Reasons, at 105, 119. 
117 See Gardner, The Gist of Excuses, at 589. 
118 See Gardner, Justifications and Reasons, at 120-21. 
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given the social Arole@ or Aform of life@ the actor occupies,  his 
subjective thinking in committing it is Areasonable@ -- that is, his 
subjective thinking manifests the Askills@ and Astandards of character@
of  Acourage, carefulness, honesty, self-discipline, diligence, humanity, 
good will, and so forth@ that society rightly expects of persons in his 
social role.119 To illustrate, Gardner asks us to imagine two actors who 
are otherwise similarly situated, one of whom is a professional 
policeman and the other of whom is an ordinary citizen.  Each actor 
shoots and kills a victim in a hostile and stressful setting in the 
mistaken belief that his respective victim is reaching for a loaded 
firearm.  Each actor is responsible because each is capable of 
reasoning intelligibly through to action; each is guilty of the offense of 
intentionally killing another person; and each commits the offense 
under circumstances that are unjustified, given that, all things 
considered, it is wrong to kill a person who presents no serious threat. 
 Whether they are Aexcused,@ Gardner says, depends upon whether 
they acted reasonably; and their reasonableness, in turn, depends 
upon whether they  exhibited the skill in sensing threats and level-
headedness in responding to stress that society rightly expects of 
policemen and ordinary citizens, respectively.  Since society can 
rightly expect greater skill and level-headedness of policemen than of 
ordinary citizens, Gardner says,  the citizen may well have a claim of 
excuse that the policeman lacks. 
The most notable thing about Gardner=s theory of excuses is 
its singularly narrow scope.  Gardner defines Aexcuse@ in such a way as 
to exclude most of the defenses that intrigue commentators, including 
insanity, sleepwalking, immaturity, and accident, mistake of fact, and 
mistake of law regarding the elements of offenses.  To be sure, 
classifying defenses narrowly is appropriate if, by doing so, one 
normatively accounts for defenses within the class and normatively 
distinguishes defenses outside the class.  But Gardner does not.  
Gardner fails to account for the exculpatory nature of duress.  And 
like Paul Robinson before him, Gardner fails to distinguish the 
 
119 Gardner, Justifications and Reasons, at 119 (Aform of life@), at 120 
(Areasonable@);  Gardner, The Gist of Excuses, at 587 (Arole@), 575 (Astandards of 
character@); id. (Acourage . . .@). 
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exculpatory nature of accident, mistake of fact, and mistake of law 
regarding defenses of justification (which he includes within Aexcuse@)
from the exculpatory nature of accident, mistake of fact, and mistake 
of law regarding elements of offenses (which he excludes from 
Aexcuse@).
Having already addressed the latter failure in connection with 
Robinson=s theory of excuse, I will focus on Gardner=s failure to 
account for duress.  Gardner=s problem with duress is this:  Gardner 
argues that excuse comes into play only with respect to offenses that 
are unjustified; yet, given Gardner=s definition of Ajustification,@
offenses committed under duress -- as opposed to offenses committed 
under mistaken duress -- ought to be regarded as offenses that are 
justified. To see why, consider a case in which duress is truly an 
excuse under Gardner=s definition as well as my own, namely, a case 
of mistaken duress.120 Suppose, for example, that a malefactor, A,
threatens to seriously harm B unless B, in turn, does something to C
that would otherwise constitute an offense X. B reasonably but 
mistakenly believes that A=s threat is genuine and does as he is 
ordered, leading to his eventually being prosecuted for committing 
offense X. How would Gardner analyze such a case?  Gardner would 
say (and rightly, I believe) that B=s offense is unjustified because 
committing offense X was not actually necessary to prevent a 
threatened harm.121 Gardner would also say (again rightly, I believe) 
that B is excused if, and only if, B acted, not with the levels of 
courage or cowardice that we statistically predict people to possess, 
but with the Acourage and self-control we have a right to expect of 
each other.@122 And, finally, Gardner would say (and again rightly, I 
believe) that B possesses the courage and self-control that society 
rightly expects when the balance between  self-interest and the 
interests of others upon which he acts  in his mind is a balance that 
society would regard as acceptable for a person in B=s social role to act 
upon in actuality.123 Now consider the kinds of duress that Gardner 
 
120 Westen & Mangiafico, The Criminal Defense of Duress, p. 948 n. 224. 
121 See Gardner, Justifications and Reason, at 105. 
122 Gardner, The Gist of Excuses, at 597.  See also id. at 578. 
123 Gardner, Justifications and Reasons, at 119-20, 122.   
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cannot explain,  namely, instances in which everything is the same 
except that B is correct in thinking that A=s threat is genuine.  A 
person who is correct in thinking that A=s threat is genuine is a person 
who acts both in his mind and in actuality upon a balance between 
self-interest and the interests of others that society regards as 
acceptable, all things considered -- which is precisely the sort of 
person whom Gardner has said is Ajustified.@124 And by Gardner=s own 
account, a person who is justified cannot also be excused. 
To be sure, Gardner=s most arresting claim is that in 
determining whether to excuse an actor for  mistaken justification, 
the law ought to judge the actor by the higher standards of skill and 
character that are appropriate to any more rigorous social role he 
occupies beyond that of ordinary citizen, whether it is the role of 
policeman, soldier, or doctor.  For our purposes, however, it is 
unnecessary to take a position on Gardner=s claim about social roles 
because, rather than being an effort to account for the way the law 
treats what he calls Aexcuses,@ it is a conscious effort to transform the 
way the law presently treats such excuses.  In any event, if Gardner=s
claim about social roles is valid, it is a claim that extends to judgments 
regarding the reasonableness of all accidents and mistakes, including 
accidents and mistakes regarding elements of offenses, not a claim (as 
Gardner would have it) that is confined to accidents and mistakes 
regarding justification.125
124 Gardner, Justifications and Reasons, at 113. 
125 Gardner argues that with respect to judgments of excuse, actors ought to 
be strictly liable for their failure to comply with the standards of the social roles 
they occupy, even if they are incapable of complying, because excuses, he says, 
are not designed to guide people=s conduct.  Gardner, The Gist of Excuses, at 596-
97.  As a defense of strict liability, the argument seems to me to be a non sequitur.
But if the argument is valid, it applies as well to judgments of reasonable 
accident and mistake in connection with elements of offenses, because the 
standards of mens rea that reasonable accidents and mistakes negate are not 
designed to guide conduct either. 
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2.  Claire Finkelstein=s Theory of ARational Excuses@
Claire Finkelstein propounds a novel definition of Aexcuses@ as 
well as a novel account for a certain subset of them.126 Finkelstein=s
definition of excuses is a function of her definition of Ajustification.@
An actor has a Atrue justification,@ she says, when the law regards the 
commission of the actus reus of an offense a Acommendable@ thing to 
do under the circumstances -- that is, when an actor is faced with a 
choice of evils such that committing the actus reus produces Agreater 
social good@ than foregoing it.127 Thus, she says, where several 
innocent persons are mortally threatened by a culpable and wrongful 
aggressor, a third party  is truly justified in killing the aggressor 
because given the choice between the death of  innocent persons and 
a culpable wrongful aggressor, the death of the aggressor is a positive 
social good.128 AExcuses,@ Finkelstein says, are the exculpatory 
defenses that remain when committing the actus reus of an offense is 
not commendable, whether because committing the actus reus leaves 
social welfare in equilibrium or because committing the actus reus 
actually reduces social welfare.129
To illustrate her notion of excuses, Finkelstein asks us to 
suppose an innocent actor=s life is threatened by several wrongful but 
morally innocent children.  The law accords the innocent actor a 
defense in the event he chooses to kill the children.  But, Finkelstein 
says, the defense is best understood as an Aexcuse@ rather than a 
Ajustification,@ because, she says, given the choice between one 
innocent life (i.e., the actor=s) and several innocent lives (i.e., the 
children=s) the death of several is not a greater social good.130 This 
means that Finkelstein includes within Aexcuse@ all of the defenses 
that Hart would include (e.g, accident, mistake of fact, and mistake of 
 
126 See Claire Finkelstein, Excuses and Dispositions in Criminal Law, 6 BUFF.
CRIM. L. R. 317 (2003); Claire Finkelstein, Self-Defense as a Rational Excuse, 57 
U. PITT. L. REV. 621 (1996); Claire Finkelstein, Duress: A Philosophical Account 
of the Defense in Law, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 252 (1995). 
127 Finkelstein, Excuses and Dispositions in Criminal Law, p. 346 (Atrue 
justifications@), p. 346 (Acommendable@), p. 328 (Agreater social good@). 
128 See Finkelstein, Self-Defense as a Rational Excuse, pp. 642-43. 
129 Finkelstein, Excuses and Dispositions in Criminal Law, p. 351, 354. 
130 Finkelstein, Excuses and Dispositions in Criminal Law, pp. 330-32. 
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law regarding elements of offenses, insanity, immaturity, 
involuntariness, duress) plus some defenses that Hart regards as 
justifications B namely, instances of self-defense and necessity in 
which the law allows actors to choose evils despite the fact that doing 
fails to produce what Finkelstein takes to be a greater social good. 
Finkelstein does not purport to possess a unitary account of  
all excuses, so defined.  Indeed, with the exception of duress, she does 
not purport to be saying anything original  about any of defenses that 
Hart regards as excuses.  Rather, she purports to be able to account 
solely for what she calls Arational excuses@ -- namely, instances of 
duress, self-defense, and necessity in which the law permits 
responsible and rational adults to commit offenses despite the fact 
that committing them  does not produce greater social good.  These 
are all instances, she says, in which actors are motivated by 
Adispositions@ of self preservation and love of family and friends that 
are socially Aadaptive,@ in that they are Adispositions an agent acquires 
in pursuing his own welfare, but which generate collective gains for 
members of society as a whole.@131 The reason the law allows mature 
and rational adults to engage in criminal acts that do not produce 
greater social good, she says, is that it Amaximizes society=s overall 
welfare@132 to encourage those adaptive dispositions, even at the price 
of tolerating criminal acts that themselves produce no greater social 
good. 
The first thing to note about Finkelstein=s approach is that it  
is not a general account of excuses, even as she defines them.  It is an 
account of a mere subset of those excuses.  Finkelstein=s analysis of 
adaptive dispositions has nothing to say about defenses of accident, 
mistake of fact and law, insanity, immaturity, and involuntariness.   
More importantly, Finkelstein does not account for the rational 
excuses she sets out to explain because she is unable to distinguish 
them from what she calls Atrue justifications.@ A person has a true 
justification to an offense, Finkelstein says, when its commission 
produces greater social good.  A person has a rational excuse to an 
 
131 Finkelstein, Excuses and Dispositions in Criminal Law, p. 346. 
132 Finkelstein, Excuses and Dispositions in Criminal Law, p. 357 n.50. 
62 Westen 
 
offense, she says, when, even though commission of the offense does 
not itself produce a greater social good, the combination of its 
commission and its encouragement of the dispositions of self 
preservation and love of family and friends that motivate its 
commission do maximize overall social welfare.  In the end, therefore, 
Finkelstein=s accounts of rational excuses and true justifications both 
come down to the same principle, namely, that an actor has a defense 
to an offense when, all things considered, the actor=s conduct is 
Acommendable@ in society=s eyes. 
 
IV.  AN ATTITUDINAL THEORY OF EXCUSE 
The measure of a normative theory is its robustness.  A robust 
normative theory of criminal excuses  (1) provides a persuasive and 
independent normative account of a substantial range of 
contemporary defenses in criminal law, (2) treats likes alike and 
unalikes unalike by including as Aexcuses@ all defenses that share the 
same  normative principle of exculpation and by excluding all 
defenses that do not,  and (3)provides normative guidance to 
jurisdictions that are considering adopting or modifying existing 
defenses.  The attitudinal theory of excuse does all these things.  
Moreover, it has the added virtue that it derives criminal excuses 
from their converse, i.e., criminal culpability and in doing so  
illuminates the nature of criminal culpability.  
I will proceed by discussing (A) the constitutive relationship 
between a state=s criminal judgment of an actor for his conduct, on 
the one hand, and its expressed belief that he acted with a 
reprehensible attitude toward either others or himself, (B) the 
normative claim that it is unjust for a state to declare that an actor 
possessed a reprehensible attitude toward others or himself that he 
lacked; and (C) the degree to which criminal excuses, as I defined 
them in part I, derive from the latter normative claim. 
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A.  The Constitutive Relationship between a State=s Criminal 
Judgment of An Actor and Its Expressed Belief that He Acted with A 
Reprehensible Attitude 
The relationship between a state=s criminal judgments of  
actors for their conduct and the state=s expression that they acted 
with certain reprehensible  attitudes is constitutive: by publicly 
declaring an actor to be guilty of a criminal offense, the state 
expresses indignation at what he has done; and by expressing 
indignation, the state expresses its belief that he acted with a certain 
disparaging attitude toward what the criminal statute at hand declares 
to be the legitimate interests of persons, including himself.  
To unpack this constitutive relationship between criminal 
judgments and attitude, let us start with the sentiment of  
resentment.  Resentment is a  sensation that a person experiences.  
However, in contrast to sensations of thirst and indigestion, 
resentment is also an emotion. And being an emotion, resentment is 
cognitive in origin, that is, it is a sensation a person experiences by 
virtue of believing that certain conditions obtain.  One can 
experience thirst or indigestion without believing that particular 
conditions exist.  But one cannot experience jealousy, envy, 
resentment or other emotion without first believing that something is 
true.133 Resentment is a Areactive@ emotion because it arises in A in 
reaction to certain beliefs on his part about the attitude that another, 
 B=s, conduct manifests toward A himself:   resentment is the emotion 
that A experiences when he believes that B has sought to aggrandize 
or indulge himself at A=s expense by engaging in conduct that 
manifests an disparaging attitude on B=s part toward what A regards 
as his own legitimate interests, whether the disparaging attitude 
consists of malice, contempt, indifference, disregard, or neglect.134
133 See Jean Hampton, Forgiveness, Resentment, and Mercy, in FORGIVENESS 
AND MERCY 54 & n.14 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Dan 
Kahan and Martha Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotions in Criminal Law, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 269, 282-84 (1996). 
134 See Peter Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in Gary Watson, ed., FREE 
WILL 59, 62-66 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982)(Areactive@); Jean 
Hampton, Forgiveness, Resentment, and Hatred, supra note ___, at 43-45, 54; Jean 
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To illustrate, consider Oliver Wendell Holmes=s observation 
that Aeven a dog distinguishes between being kicked and being 
stumbled over.@135 The dog experiences the kick as painful, regardless 
of the attitude that motivated it.  But the dog resents the pain only if 
the dog believes that the kick was the product of malice, contempt, or 
disregard.  Much the same is true of people.  A person who is struck 
from behind may be filled with immediate anger, based on the 
assumption that the blow is the product of another=s malice or 
carelessness.  But as soon as the injured person discovers that the 
individual who struck him is blind and helpless.  His person=s
resentment abates  not because he thinks he shouldn=t be resentful, 
but because he cannot be resentful once he no longer believes that the 
blow originated in a disregard of his legitimate interests. 
To be sure, the scope of a person=s resentment depends upon 
the scope of what he assesses his legitimate interests to be.  A person 
with an exaggerated sense of self-importance will take offense where 
more a modest person would not.  Regardless of whether the 
community at large agrees with individuals about their self-
importance, however, resentment functions as a normative sentiment 
because it rests upon an assessment of what a person believes to be 
the legitimate relationship between his self-interest and the  interests 
of others.136
As I have said, resentment is the emotion a person, A, feels in 
reaction to what he believes to be B=s selfish efforts to indulge B
himself at A=s personal expense.  However, A can experience a similar 
 emotion of indignation at what he believes to be the indignity that B
Hampton, The Retributive Idea, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 124-25.  See generally 
Antony Duff, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENT 39-40 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986);  T.M. Scanlon, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 268-
72 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998); R. Jay Wallace, 
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 66-67, 74-75, 76-77. 
135 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., THE COMMON LAW 13 (Boston: Little, 
Brown, & Co., 1881). 
136 See Jeffrie Murphy, Forgiveness and Resentment, in FORGIVENESS AND 
MERCY 18 (Cambridge: Cambirdge University Press, 19888); R. Jay Wallace, 
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS 33-39 (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1984). 
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inflicts upon a third party, C, or even at an indignity that B inflicts 
upon B himself.137 Thus, a person can be indignant at the abusive 
way a teenager treats his parents, or indignant at the way a teenager 
mutilates or abuses her own body, feeling that the teenager manifests 
a lack of appropriate dignity toward her  parents or herself.  Like 
resentment, indignation is a reactive emotion that is triggered by A=s
belief regarding B=s failure to accord a person, including B himself, the 
dignity that A believes the person deserves; and, hence, the scope of 
A=s indignation is a function of what A assesses to be the dignity that  
persons deserve.   A=s assessment of the dignity that others deserve 
may or may not reflect the standards of the community at large.  Like 
resentment, however, indignation remains a normative sentiment  
because it rests on an assessment of what the indignant person 
believes to be the legitimate interests of persons. 
A criminal judge who convicts and sentences a defendant 
does three things --of which the second is the most significant for our 
purposes: (1) the judge adjudges the defendant to have engaged in 
conduct that the state declares to be regrettable or otherwise 
undesirable; (2) the judge reproaches or condemns the defendant by 
expressing society=s collective indignation at him for his conduct; and 
(3) the judge typically imposes upon the defendant some form of hard 
treatment that the judge explicitly or implicitly declares the defendant 
 to deserve by virtue of defendant=s being a proper object of reproach. 
 Now perhaps one can imagine a regime in which judges do only the 
first and neither express society=s collective indignation at defendants 
nor impose hard treatment upon them by virtue of their deserving 
such indignation.  Barbara Wooten proposed such a scheme.  She 
proposed that traditional criminal law be replaced with an institution 
consisting of two stages, neither of which would involve expressions of 
indignation: an adjudicatory stage at which judges would determine 
whether actors engaged in regrettable or undesirable conduct, 
without, however, reproving or reproaching them for it; and a second 
stage at which judges would determine how dangerous the actors were 
 
137 See R. Jay Wallace, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS at 18-
23. 
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and what protective or therapeutic measures, if any, would be 
necessary, to prevent them from engaging in such conduct again.138
The reality, of course, is quite different.  In reality, the criminal justice 
system not only adjudicates the existence of wrongful conduct but 
also expresses society=s collective indignation at defendants for their 
wrongful conduct.139 Every criminal judgment of which I am aware is 
not only an adjudication of facts but an implicit or explicit expression 
of society=s normative sentiments regarding the attitudes with which 
the defendant acted.  Being expressions of indignation and reproach, 
criminal judgments express societal sentiment that  defendants sought 
to aggrandize or indulge themselves  by acting with malice, contempt, 
 indifference, disregard or neglect toward what the criminal law 
regards as the legitimate interests of persons, including the interests of 
defendants themselves. 
 
B.  The Normative Claim that It Is Unjust To Condemn Actors 
for Possessing Reprehensible Attitudes They Lack 
We have seen that to condemn a person for his conduct is to 
express indignation toward him; and to express indignation is to 
declare him to have engaged in the conduct with a disparaging 
attitude toward the legitimate interests of persons, including, perhaps, 
legitimate interests of his own.  When the state condemns a 
defendant  for conduct that, for all the state knows, was not motivated 
by disparaging attitudes toward himself and others, the state commits 
two prima facie wrongs.   The state wrongs the public by expressing a 
falsehood, the falsehood being the state=s explicit or implicit assertion 
that the defendant acted on the basis of a disparaging attitude that 
 
138 For a critical discussion of Wooten=s views, see H.L.A. Hart, PUNISHMENT 
AND RESPONSIBILITY 193-209. 
139 Cf. Antony Duff, TRIALS AND PUNISHMENT 39-40 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986); Kadish, Excusing Crime, p. 264 (AIt may be 
argued that . . . it is not intrinsic to judgments of criminality in our society that 
they express a moral fault.  But this view is surely mistaken.@); Jeffrie Murphy, 
Introduction, in FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 8 (Apunishment may be regarded as the 
institutionalization of such emotions as resentment and indignation@); Robert 
Schopp, Justification Defenses and Just Convictions, 24 PACIFIC L.J. 1233, 1258-62 
(1993). 
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the state has not proven he possessed.140 Worse yet, the state wrongs 
the defendant by subjecting him to what may be the  greatest harm a 
state can inflict on its citizens, viz., the harm of publicly declaring 
that, in addition to committing a bad act, the defendant has revealed 
himself to have been a bad person deserving of society=s low regard.  
Indeed, it is precisely to avoid those wrongs that states typically 
refrain from punishing defendants for bad acts unless states can prove 
that defendants acted with attitudes of malice, contempt, 
indifference, disregard, or neglect or neglect of the interests of oneself 
or others.  To invoke the language of the Model Penal Code, states 
typically refrain from punishing defendants for bad acts unless they 
can prove that defendants acted with Apurpose@ to harm themselves 
or others, Aknowledge@ that they are harming themselves or others, or 
Aextreme indifference,@ Arecklessness@ or Anegligence@ regarding the 
legitimate interests of themselves or others.   Indeed, that is what 
commentators mean when they say that states typically inflict  Amoral 
blame@ only upon defendants who have revealed themselves to be 
morally Ablameworthy.@141 They mean that states typically represent 
defendants to have been bad persons by virtue of the attitudes with 
which they acted only if states prove them to have been bad persons 
by virtue of the attitudes with which they acted. 
This is not to deny the existence of  strict liability in criminal 
law.  Some states hold criminal defendants strictly  liable for certain 
offenses, regardless of the attitudes with which the defendants may 
have acted.   Nevertheless, most commentators regard strict liability 
as unjust, particularly with respect to major offenses carrying serious 
penalties.142 And commentators do so precisely because of the 
 
140 Cf. Sanford Kadish, Excusing Crime, p. 264 (ATo blame a person is to 
express a moral criticism, and if the person's action does not deserve criticism, 
blaming him is a kind of falsehood@); Scanlon, What We Owe To Each Other 
267 (A[T]he condemnatory aspect of punishment is subject to a further 
requirement:  the condemnation must be appropriate.  What triggers this 
requirement is not the unpleasantness of the condemnation, but the content of the 
judgment expressed.
141 See, e.g., Kadish, Excusing Crime, pp. 257, 282. 
142 See, e.g., Andrew Ashworth, Principles of Criminal Law 168-69 (3d ed., 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Peter Cane, RESPONSIBILITY IN LAW 
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normative claim that it is unjust for the state to reproach defendants 
(and, thereby, express the belief that they acted with bad attitudes 
with respect to interests the criminal law protects), unless the state 
proves that defendants did, indeed, act with those bad attitudes.143
C.  The Degree to Which Criminal Excuses Derive from the 
Aforementioned Normative Claim 
Excuses, as I defined them in part I, consist of all exculpatory 
defenses in criminal law other than the absence of actus reus and the 
existence of justification.  Excuses thus include (1) instances in which 
conduct is not the product of a person=s will; (2) instances of 
accident, mistake of fact, and mistake of law regarding either the 
elements of offenses or the elements of justification; (3) immaturity; 
(4) lack of cognition due to insanity or involuntary intoxication;  
(5)fugue states of automatism, such as  hypnosis and sleepwalking; 
and (6) lack of volition due to insanity or involuntary intoxication.  
Significantly, these are precisely the defenses that a jurisdiction would 
 adopt if it used criminal sanctions to express public reproach (as all 
jurisdictions do), and if the jurisdiction regarded it as unjust to 
reproach defendants for having acted with  reprehensible attitudes 
toward themselves or others that the defendants did not possess.  This 
is so because each of these six conditions precludes  actors from 
 
AND MORALITY 109-10 (Oxford: Hart Publishing,, 2002); Antony Duff, Strict 
Liability, Legal Presumptions, and the Presumption of Innocence, manuscript on file 
with ______, text accompanying note 19; Douglas Husak and Richard Singer, 
Of Innocence and Innocents: The Supreme Court and Mens Rea Since Herbert 
Packer, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. R. 859, 860 (1999); Sanford H. Kadish, BLAME AND 
PUNISHMENT: ESSAYS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW 89-91 (1987); Andrew Simester & 
Robert Sullivan, CRIMINAL LAW: THEORY AND DOCTRINE 173-74 (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing,, 2000). 
143 Critics of character theory argue that it cannot account for the fact that 
he criminal law punishes certain actors whom society regards as possessing good 
character, such as a compassionate wife who helps her suffering and terminally ill 
husband end his life.   See Finkelstein, Excuses and Dispositions in Criminal Law,
p. 338.  The latter critique is inapposite to attitudinal theory.  The measure of an 
actor=s attitude for purposes of attitudinal theory is the respect or lack of respect  
that his act manifests, not for moral interests in general, but for the interests that 
the criminal statute at hand seeks to safeguard. 
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possessing the reprehensible attitudes toward themselves or others 
that official condemnation represents defendants to have possessed. 
 
1.  Conduct That Is Not the Product of Will 
It is a defense in most jurisdictions that a crime occurred 
because the defendant was physically pushed or pulled or carried by 
another person, or that he was the victim of a reflex action or of 
epilepsy.144 Now it is sometimes said that the reason such absences of 
will are defenses is that, rather than negating mens rea on a 
defendant=s part, these conditions negate the existence of any act on 
his part, much less a bad act.145 I think it is misleading to 
conceptualize these defenses in terms of acts.  For one thing, framing 
the defense in terms of acts  implies that the defendant is not a but/for 
cause of  harms or risks that the state seeks to prevent; while in reality 
the state regrets automobile fatalities by epilepsy fully as much as auto 
fatalities by speeding. Furthermore, framing the defense in terms of 
acts implies that an actor cannot be blamed for it, regardless of his 
culpability in allowing himself to fall prey to such interventions; while 
in reality an actor such as an epileptic who culpably places himself in 
a setting in which epilepsy endangers others is culpable for the harms 
that result from epileptic attacks.146
Instead, as Paul Robinson observes, it is more perspicuous to 
regard instances of absence of will as excuses.147 A person who is the 
but/for cause of a harm or risk that the state regards as regrettable is 
one who satisfies the actus reus elements of the offense at issue.  The 
reason that victims of pushing or pulling, victims of reflex actions,  
and victims of epilepsy are exonerated  is that they are excused of 
responsibility for elements of actus reus they cause.  Attitudinal 
accounts of excuse explain why they are excused -- and why, 
 
144 See Model Penal Code ' 2.01. 
145 See generally Michael Moore, ACT AND CRIME: THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
ACTION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL LAW (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1993). 
146 See Paul Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One=s Own Defense, 71 
VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW 1 (1985). 
147 Paul Robinson, STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION IN CRIMINAL LAW at 35-38. 
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moreover, they are the clearest candidates for exculpation: persons 
whose conduct is the product of an entire absence of will are persons 
who lack a disparaging attitude toward the legitimate interests of 
others or themselves because, entirely lacking in will, they possess no 
instrumental attitudes at all.   
 
2.  Accident, Mistake of Fact, and Mistake of Law 
Reasonable accidents and reasonable mistakes of fact 
regarding elements of offenses are invariably defenses to all but strict-
liability offenses; and reasonable accidents and mistakes of fact 
regarding elements of justification are nearly always defenses, too.    In 
contrast, reasonable mistakes of law regarding elements of offenses 
and the elements of justification are less often defenses, because 
criminal  law typically presumes  that all mistakes of law are 
unreasonable, despite evidence to the contrary.  Nevertheless, 
commentators are increasingly of the view that actors ought to be 
exonerated when they commit mala  prohibita offenses by virtue of  
mistakes of law that even conscientious persons would make.148 An 
attitudinal account of excuses explains why these defenses exist and 
why commentators advocate enlarging the defense of mistake of law.  
A person makes a mistake of fact when, although he is aware of what 
the state regards as wrongful conduct, he is unaware that he is in fact 
doing such a thing.  A person makes a mistake of law when, although 
he is aware of what he is in fact doing, he is unaware that the state 
regards the doing of such things as wrong.   Normatively, an actor 
who commits the actus reus of an offense because of a reasonable 
mistake of law is just as blameless as an actor who does so because of a 
reasonable mistake of fact:   for neither of them  knows or has reason 
to know that he is doing anything that society regards as wrong and, 
hence, neither of them acts with an attitude of disregard nor neglect 
 
148 See, e.g., Douglas Husak & Andrew von Hirsch, Culpability and Mistake of 
Law, in ACTION AND VALUE IN CRIMINAL LAW 157 (John Gardner, Jeremy 
Horder, and Stephen Shute. eds., 1993); John Parry, Culpability, Mistake, and 
Official Interpretations of Law, 25 Am. J. Crim. L. 1, 5-36 (1997); Stephen 
Garvey, The Moral Emotions in Criminal Law, 22 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 145, 149 
(2003). 
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for what the statute declares to be the legitimate interests of 
themselves or others.  
An attitudinal theory also explains why all accidents and 
mistakes, even those that are unreasonable, are defenses to offenses 
predicated upon mental states of purpose, knowledge or intention.   
When the state punishes a person for a crime of purpose, knowledge, 
or intention, it condemns him not only for committing the actus reus 
but also for doing so with an attitude of a certain kind, namely, an 
attitude of self-aggrandizing malice or contempt toward the legitimate 
interests of himself or others.  A person who commits the actus reus 
accidentally or by mistake lacks those disparaging attitudes.  Just as it 
is both false and unjust to condemn a person for possessing some 
disparaging attitude when he lacks any such attitude, it is equally false 
and unjust to condemn a person for possessing a specific disparaging 
attitude when he lacks that attitude. 
 
3.  Immaturity 
Childhood and youth are universally defenses to the most 
heinous of offenses.  The reason that children possess such defenses is 
not that they are entirely unaware of  what they are doing or that it is 
wrong.  On the contrary, children can typically recount what they 
have done in words that are not very different from the words of the 
criminal law; and children typically realize they are doing something 
wrong, particularly with respect to serious offenses.  What children 
are too immature and inexperienced to understand, and, indeed, what 
the state assumes they are incapable of understanding,  is the 
normative significance of the interests they infringe.149 That is, 
children are incapable of understanding why people care so much 
about these interests  and why society regards them as worthy of 
protection.150 Because children are incapable of appreciating those 
 
149 See S. Asquith, Justice, Retribution and Children in A. MORRIS & H. 
GILLER, EDS., PROVIDING CRIMINAL JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN 7, 14 (London: 
Edward Arnold, 1983). 
150 See Peter Arenella, Character, Choice and Moral Agency, in E. F. PAUL,
FRED  D. MILLER JR. & J. PAUL, EDS., CRIME, CULPABILITY AND REMEDY 59, at 67-
68 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990): 
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interests in the way adults do, their conduct is incapable of 
manifesting disparaging attitudes toward those interests -- or, at least, 
incapable of manifesting the kind of  malice, contempt, indifference, 
disregard and neglect that the state expresses when it punishes 
criminal offenses.  Children are excused because to punish them 
would be to express that they possessed disparaging attitudes toward 
the legitimate interests of others that they lack.151
4.  Lack of Cognition Due to Insanity or Involuntary Intoxication 
Nearly all jurisdictions regard it as a defense to the actus reus 
of an offense that by virtue of pathological or involuntarily-induced 
intoxication, an actor did not know what he was in fact doing, or if he 
did know what he was in fact doing, he did not know that it was 
wrong.  Both defenses can be regarded as species of insanity 
defenses152 -- the former for persons whose insanity tends to be 
chronic and is  pathological in origin, the latter for persons whose 
insanity is temporary and results from involuntary intoxication.  Both 
defenses also possess features that distinguish them from the 
previously-considered defenses of mistake of fact and mistake of law.  
Nevertheless, for purposes of excuse theory, the distinctions are 
superficial because the function of cognitive defenses of insanity is to 
treat sane and insane persons  equally with respect to the exculpatory 
 
The six-year-old who took the toy while "knowing" it was a bad thing to do 
made a practical judgment about whether the satisfaction of getting it 
outweighed the risk of getting caught and punished. He has not had sufficient 
time and experience to internalize moral norms as something worthy of his 
respect. Nor does he have sufficient empathy and understanding for the feelings 
of other human beings as separate selves that would provide him with the moral 
comprehension and motivation to act on the basis of moral reasons that place 
constraints on his self-interested acts. 
151 Cf.  Stephen Morse, Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 15, 23 (1997): 
[I]t [is] unjust to express a negative moral reactive attitude . . .  to an agent 
who lacked the capacity when she breached to understand and be guided by 
good, normative reason. 
152 Cf. Model Penal Code ' 2.08(4), defining the defense of involuntary 
intoxication in the same terms as the insanity defense of ' 4.01(1(1). 
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principle that underlies the defenses of mistake of fact and mistake of 
law.  
To examine the normative equivalence that exists between  
ordinary defenses of mistakes of fact and law and cognitive defenses of 
insanity,  consider a feature that distinguishes the former from the 
latter, namely, the requirement that the ordinary mistakes of fact or 
law be  reasonable.  A sane person has  a complete defense of mistake 
of fact or law only if his mistakes are reasonable.  In contrast, an 
insane person has a complete defense if he is merely mistaken about 
what he is in fact doing or mistaken in thinking it is not wrong, 
regardless of how unreasonable his mistakes would be in a sane 
person.   As previously discussed, however, the reason that even 
unreasonable mistakes of fact and law are defenses for the insane is 
that by virtue of being mistaken, they do not realize that they are 
infringing upon the legitimate interests of others, and by virtue of 
being insane, they are unable to recognize the very thing that 
distinguishes them from sane persons, i.e., that their mistakes are 
unreasonable.  Assume, for example, that an insane person makes the 
mistake of fact of thinking that he is squeezing a lemon rather than 
his spouse=s neck, or the mistake of fact of thinking that the person 
whom he is killing is an imminent threat to his life rather than no 
threat at all.  Believing that he is squeezing a lemon or killing a lethal 
and wrongful attacker, the insane person believes that he is respecting 
the legitimate interests of others.   And being insane, he is unable to 
recognize the egregiousness of his mistake.  Like a sane person who 
wrongfully kills another because of a reasonable mistake of fact, an 
insane person who wrongfully kills another because of an 
unreasonable  mistake of fact is excused because, although the insane 
person commits the actus reus of killing an innocent person, he lacks 
the attitudes of maliciousness, contempt, indifference, disregard, and 
neglect toward the legitimate interests of others that state-imposed 
blame represents offenders as possessing.  
Another feature that distinguishes the ordinary defense of 
mistake of law from the cognitive defense of insanity concerns the 
relevance of believing that one is acting lawfully.  A sane actor has a 
defense of mistake of law only if he believes he is acting lawfully.  In 
74 Westen 
 
contrast, an insane person who believes he is  acting unlawfully may 
nevertheless possess a defense if he does not believe his conduct is 
wrong.153 The reason that an insane person may have a defense to 
conduct he knows is unlawful is that, being insane, he may not 
understand what sane people invariably do, namely, that conduct that 
the state regards as unlawful is conduct that the people of state also 
regard as a wrong thing to do.  For in his delusion, an insane person 
may possess a belief that a sane person would not, viz., that even 
though the people of the state regard his conduct as unlawful, they 
nevertheless do not regard his conduct as a wrong thing to do.  
Assume, for example, that because of his insanity, a person believes 
(1) that God has directly ordered him to kill a particular person, and 
(2) that the people of the state wish persons to follow God=s direct 
orders when God=s order conflict with society=s laws.  The insane 
person knows that he is violating the law.  But like the sane person 
who makes a reasonable mistake of law, he lacks a bad attitude 
because believes he is acting consistently with what the people of the 
state regard as the legitimate interests of others under the 
circumstances.154
5.  Fugue States of Automatism 
Hypnosis, sleepwalking, and other fugue states of automatism 
are defenses in most jurisdictions.  Commentators typically explain 
why such conditions are defenses by classifying them with epilepsy 
and reflex actions as states of Ainvoluntariness.@155 However, it is 
misleading to classify automatism with instances in which persons are 
entirely lacking will, because automatism involves complex, agent-
directed actions in which actors perceive the world, make means/ends 
 
153 See Model Penal Code ' 4.01(1)(leaving it to states to exculpate insane 
persons who, though they appreciate the Acriminality@ of their conduct, do not 
appreciate its Awrongfulness@). 
154 He would be acting with a bad attitude if he chose to follow God=s orders 
in disregard of the law while knowing full well that people of the state prefer 
persons who hear orders from God to follow the law when God=s orders and the 
law conflict. 
155 See, e.g., Deborah Denno,  Crime and Consciousness: Science and 
Involuntary Acts 87 MINN. L. REV. 269, 271 (2002). 
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judgments about it, and act to carry out their ends.156 Consider Mrs. 
Cogdon, the sleepwalker.157 While in a state of somnambulism, Mrs. 
Cogdon descended the stairs of her house without falling, crossed the 
yard to the woodpile where she found the axe she was seeking, 
returned to the house with the axe, mounted the stairs, again without 
missing a step, entered her daughter=s bedroom, and using the axe for 
the purpose of chopping, struck her sleeping daughter in the head, 
killing her.  Mrs. Cogdon=s actions were not the reflexes of a person 
entirely lacking in will.  They were agent-directed actions that the 
most sophisticated robots could scarcely perform.  They were the 
actions of a person who perceived the world, made judgments about it 
with respect to her ends, and carried them out.  
This is not to say that Mrs. Cogdon should not be excused for 
what she did.  Rather, it is to say that excusing Mrs. Cogdon on 
grounds of Ainvoluntariness@ is misleading because her conduct was 
the product of numerous choices, such as choosing how to hold and 
wield an axe.  Excusing her for not being able to Acontrol herself@ is 
equally misleading because there is no way to establish that an actor 
who chooses to do something could not have chosen otherwise.  The 
reason Mrs. Cogdon should be excused is that she performed her 
actions in a profound state of dissociation from the normative 
attitudes that constitute her as a person , that is, her attitudes 
regarding the legitimate interests of herself and others.158
Condemning her would be unjust because it would represent her to 
have possessed a certain malice or contempt for her daughter=s
legitimate interests that she lacked.159 She was as fully disconnected 
from the normative attitudes of the agent who killed her daughter as 
one person is disconnected from another.160 To condemn her for 
 
156 See note ____, supra. 
157 See Sanford Kadish and Stephen Schulhofer, Criminal Law and Its 
Processes 178 (Gaithersburg, New York: Aspen Publishers, 7th edition, 2001). 
158 See Morse, Acts, Choices, and Coercion, p. 1649. 
159 Robert Schopp, Multiple Personality Disorder, Accountable Agency, and 
Criminal Acts,10 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 297, 309-10 (2001).   
160 Students of psychology differ as to whether the diagnostic syndrome,  
AMultiple Personality Disorder,@ is, indeed, a valid phenomenon.  See Schopp, 
Multiple Personality Disorder, Accountable Agency, and Criminal Acts, at 299-300 
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what she did is analogous to condemning an unwitting actor, A, for 
the harms he unwittingly inflicts upon B at C=s behest simply because 
C can be proved to have acted with malice.    
To be sure, a person who commits the actus reus of an offense 
while under hypnosis may be culpable if he subjected himself to 
hypnosis for the purpose of committing the offense, or while 
indifferent to it, or neglectful of the possibility that he might commit 
it.  But otherwise the offense manifests the disparaging attitudes of 
the hypnotist, not the person whom he hypnotizes.  The same is true 
of sleepwalkers, except that with sleepwalking, there is no hypnotist 
and, hence, no one else to condemn.   
 
6.  Lack of Volition Due to Insanity or Involuntary Intoxication 
Many jurisdictions regard it as a defense to commit the actus 
reus of an offense because of pathological insanity or insanity induced 
by involuntary intoxication that precludes a person from being able to 
control himself.  Thus, the Model Penal Code, which numerous 
jurisdictions follow, provides a defense to a person who, because of 
insanity or involuntary  intoxication, lacks substantial capacity Ato 
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law.@161 These so-
called Avolitional@ defenses of insanity and involuntary intoxication 
are designed for persons like Mark Bechard who, though they appear 
to know what they are doing and know that it is wrong, nevertheless 
tend to evoke pity in observers rather than indignation.162 The 
enduring question, of course, is why conduct such as Bechard=s tends 
to evoke pity in observers rather than indignation.  As we have seen, 
it is not because Bechard could not Acontrol himself,@ because lack of 
 
(2001).  However, for the argument that in so far as MPD exists, to punish a 
Ahost@ for the conduct of an Aalter@ is tantamount to punishing a person for the 
conduct of another or of another over whom the former person has no control, 
see Elyn Saks, Multiple Personality Disorder and Criminal Responsibility, 10 S. CAL.
INTERDIS. L.J. 185, 189-94 (2001).  But see Jennifer Radden, Am I My Alter=s
Keeper?, 10 S. CAL. INTERDIS. L.J. 253 (2001). 
161 Model Penal Code '' 2.08(1), 4.01(1). 
162 See Kadish, Excusing Crime, p. 279 (AMany defendants acquitted on 
grounds of legal insanity, particularly those with psychoses, "knew" what they 
were doing and "meant" to do it in a literal sense.@). 
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control is a metaphor for some undefined feature of his conduct that 
evokes pity.   I believe that an attitudinal theory of excuse accounts 
for that feature because it addresses what is most salient in 
schizophrenics like Bechard.   
The most salient feature of Mark Bechard=s behavior on the 
day of the murders was that, being populated by cacophonous voices 
that left him Ayell[ing] at himself from inside himself,@ Bechard 
engaged in conduct that was profoundly irrational to everyone 
involved, including himself.163 Commentators have long observed 
that the hallmark of criminal insanity is Airrationality.@164 A person 
acts Arationally@ when he chooses means that are plausibly designed to 
advance what he regards as personal ends Bechard was able to 
engage in means/ends analysis of a primitive sort, because he was able 
to select means that were effective in killing his victims.  Yet Bechard 
found it impossible to explain to anyone, including himself, how 
killing nuns whom he personally and religiously cherished could 
possibly advance anything that he regarded as a personal end.  When 
Bechard tried to explain, he either fell into nonsense or confessed 
bewilderment.   He first said that mysterious voices told him to go to 
the convent to get Acat smut@ to Asave the Pixie.@ He then said, AI
don=t know why [I killed the nuns].  I loved them.@
What commentators have not yet explained, however, is why 
jurisdictions regard irrationality as exculpatory.  Why should the 
perpetrators of horrific acts like Mark Bechard=s be exculpated simply 
 
163 Cf. Stephen Morse, AExcusing the Crazy:  The Insanity Defense 
Reconsidered,@ 58 Southern California Law Review 777, 813  (1985): 
We can understand that some test was originally needed to cope with cases of 
crazy persons who seemed to know right from wrong, but nevertheless acted for 
crazy reasons. . . .  But such a person is not compelled simply because he or she 
acts on the basis of a strongly held, albeit crazy, belief.  Nor is the person 
compelled because craziness influenced the behavior. [A]ction pursuant to a 
crazy desire is no more compelled than action based on a normal desire.  The 
proper reason to excuse, of course, is that the person was irrational -- even 
though narrowly aware of right and wrong -- not that the person was compelled. 
164 See, e.g.,  Stephen Morse, ABrain and Blame,@ 84 Geo. L.J. 527, 539 
(1996); Kadish, Excusing Crime, p. 282; Michael Moore, Law and Psychiatry: 
Rethinking the Relationship 244-45 (1984). 
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because their conduct appears to be profoundly irrational to everyone, 
including themselves?  It cannot be because punishing such actors 
would not protect the public, because it would.  And it cannot be 
because punishing them would not deter sane actors from being 
tempted to commit atrocities under the pretense of being irrational, 
because, again, it would.165 It must be because something in the 
irrationality they exhibit precludes observers from experiencing the 
reactive emotion of indignation.   I believe that it is because by virtue 
of their irrationality, they lack an attitude that is a predicate to the 
cognitive emotion of indignation.  Indignation is the normative 
emotion a person, A, experiences when he believes that another 
person, B, selfishly seeks to aggrandize or indulge himself at the 
expense of the legitimate interests of others.   A person cannot act 
selfishly to aggrandize or indulge himself without being able to make 
sense of his goals.  Bechard may have acted with an attitude of 
contempt or even malice toward the legitimate interests of the nuns 
he killed.  But he cannot be seen to have acted selfishly to indulge 
himself at the expense of the nuns, because he was as bewildered as 
we are as to why he was doing it or what he hoped to gain from it. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Twenty years ago, Kent Greenawalt bemoaned what he called 
the Aundevelopment of theories of justification and excuse,@ and he 
urged scholars to give serious attention to the Alaudatory goal@ of 
Aachieving greater clarity between justification and excuse.@166 Yet, 
rather than reserving judgment until scholars had had an opportunity 
to do so, Greenawalt proceeded to declare that classifying criminal 
defenses by reference to justification and excuse Ais not an appropriate 
[objective] for Anglo-American penal law.@167 I think Greenawalt=s
judgment was premature.  Scholars have devoted a great deal of 
attention to justification and excuse in the intervening years, as 
Greenawalt himself urged them to.  Thanks to their efforts, it is now 
possible, I believe, to classify and draft criminal defenses with 
 
165 See H.L.A Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of 
Law18-19 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968). 
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reference to the distinction between justification and excuse without 
falling afoul of the problems that troubled Greenawalt. 
A major barrier to conceptual clarity has been the very term 
Ajustification.@ Because people tend to associate justification  with its 
cognate, Ajustice,@ they tend to confine Ajustification@ to conduct that 
is just, rather than treat it as including all conduct that is not unjust.
How different things might have been if, instead of being framed in 
terms of Ajustification@ and excuse, the issue had all along been 
framed in terms of Aprivilege@ and excuse, or even Apermission@ and 
excuse! A second barrier has been the tendency to assume that 
justification is a function of what an actor believes he is doing rather 
than what he actually does.  By conceptualizing justification in terms 
of an actor=s belief rather than his acts, commentators made it 
impossible to distinguish justification from excuses such as accident, 
mistake, and cognitive insanity. A  third barrier has been the 
tendency to classify the defense to which Greenawalt himself devoted 
most of his attention, viz., the defense of duress, as an excuse rather 
than a justification.  By classifying duress with insanity and mistake of 
fact rather than with self-defense and necessity, Greenawalt and 
others precluded themselves from making sense of the distinction 
between justification and excuse.    
It is now possible to see that the distinction between 
justification and excuse, properly understood, is as basic as the 
distinction between absence of actus reus and absence of mens rea.
Indeed, the two distinctions reset on common principles of 
exculpation.  The difference between justification and excuse is as 
basic and simple as the distinction between, A AI did nothing wrong,@
and AEven if I did, it was not my fault.@ Excuse thus includes 
accidents, mistakes of fact and law, absence of will, automatism, 
immaturity, insanity, involuntary intoxication.  
 One of the benefits of Adistinguish[ing] rigorously between 
justification and excuse@168 is that it reveals that despite their 
diversity, excuses share a single principle of exculpation in common.  I 
 
166 Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, pp. 1913, 1927. 
167 Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, pp. 1913, 1927. 
168 Greenawalt, Perplexing Borders, p. 1903. 
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argue that excuses reflect the principle that, whether or not a person 
has brought about a harm or risk that the state regrets, all things 
considered, it is nevertheless unjust for the state to blame him unless 
he acted with an attitude of selfish or self-indulgent disregard for what 
the state, speaking in its criminal statutes, regards as the legitimate 
interests of persons under the circumstances, whether  the attitude 
consists of malice, contempt, indifference, disregard, or neglect.   
Attitudinal theory, in turn, provides a norm to guide 
jurisdictions in restating or reforming existing defenses.  Volitional 
defenses of insanity and of involuntary intoxication, for example, are 
controversial in part because of skepticism about what it means to say 
that a person who chooses to do something could not Acontrol 
himself.@169 Attitudinal theory provides an alternative way to 
conceptualize the defense, capturing what observers tend to regard as 
exculpatory about certain kinds of knowing but irrational conduct by 
insane and involuntarily intoxicated persons.   Attitudinal theory also 
suggests that the defense of mistake of law ought to be as broad as the 
defense of mistake of fact.  A person makes a reasonable mistake of 
law when, although he knows what he is in fact doing, he does not 
know and has no reason to know that the state regards such conduct  
as wrongful.   A person who makes a mistake of law of that sort is just 
as blameless as a person who knows what the state regards as wrongful 
but does not know and has no reason to know that he is in fact doing 
such a thing, because both are persons who, though they may be 
doing something the criminal law regards as regrettable, all things 
considered, nevertheless act with attitudes of proper respect for the 
legitimate interests of persons. 
Finally, by virtue of illuminating the normative nature of 
excuse, attitudinal theory also illuminates the normative nature of 
blame.  Excuse negates blame, in that it adjudges persons to be 
unworthy of reproach despite the heinousness of their criminal 
wrongdoing.  A normative theory of excuse is an hypothesis as to the 
features that render a person normatively blameless for criminal 
harms or risks that he produces or the otherwise undesirable conduct 
 
169 See note ____ supra. 
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in which he engages.  According to attitudinal theory, the feature 
that renders persons normatively blameless -- and, typically, legally 
blameless, too -- is the possession of a certain attitude with which he 
engages in such wrongdoing.   A person is normatively blameless for 
engaging in conduct that a statute prohibits  if he was motivated by 
proper respect for interests that the statute seeks to protect.  
Conversely, a person is normatively blameworthy for engaging in 
conduct that a statute prohibits if he was motivated by an attitude of 
disrespect for the interests that the statute seeks to protect, whether 
the attitude consists of malice, contempt, indifference, callousness, or 
inadvertence toward those interests.170
170 My colleague Tom Green has said in conversation although lack of a bad 
attitude may justly suffice to negate blameworthiness, the presence of a bad 
attitude does not necessarily suffice to attribute blameworthiness, because, in the 
event all persons are pre-determined to possessed the attitudes they end up 
possessing, it may be unjust to blame them for attitudes they could not help but 
possess.  For the argument that concerns about free will and determinism are 
incoherent and, hence, no basis for further concerns or arguments about criminal 
justice, see Peter Westen, The False Problem of Free Will and Determinism (in 
draft). 
